SECRETARY McNAMARA, THE NAVY AND THE CVA-67 CONTROVERSY

David R. Oliver

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by

D. R. Oliver, Jr.

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There appears to be general agreement that the Robert McNamara era of Defense Department management produced (or resulted in) fundamental changes in the relationship of Congress, the Public, the Executive and the Military with respect to the manner in which "military" decisions are made.[1] At the same time, there appears to be widespread agreement that McNamara made some critical changes in the manner in which the Defense Department is organized and operated.[2]

Another facet of the "common wisdom" which exists with respect to the McNamara era deals with the Services' response to these changes. For example, there is a rather large school of thought that is convinced that the Navy suffered at the hands of the McNamara team primarily because of the Navy's indecision about how to react to the criteria and techniques imposed by the new management...followed by clumsiness."[3]

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1. For example see Leslie Gelb--"[illegible]
"The erosion of support for the military from the public and in the Congress which has altered this situation (the influence of the military on Presidential decisions) was brought about by the Vietnam war, Robert McNamara's years as secretary of defense, and later charges of cost overruns and other types of mismanagement in the Department of Defense.... Secretary McNamara upgraded civilian advice, and less weight was given to professional military expertise. In Washington, the feeling grew that civilians knew as much about defense as the military, and that the services were so concerned with their parochial interests that civilians were needed to arbitrate among them and to ensure that all focused on the President's view about national security." "Domestic Change and National Security Policy," in Henry Owen (ed.), The Next Phase in Foreign Policy. (Washington: Brookings, 1973), p. 263.

2. This not only includes the introduction of academia and "think-tank" personnel to actual management (in addition to consultant) roles, but also includes McNamara's highly personal and successful style which centralized decision-making in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

3. James M. Roherty, Decisions of R. S. McNamara. (Florida: University of Miami Press, 1970), p. 142. It should be noted that of all the books on McNamara, this is one of the very few which can have any

If one starts with the basic premise that United States "National Security" has as one of its pillars, the capability of the United States Armed Forces, one could become very interested in whether or not (or how), the Services changed to conform with the new situation. The first step in such a determination is to ensure that one's assumptions are correct. One approach to accomplishing this check would be to select one specific service/McNamara dispute and attempt to determine if the events can be explained by the existing model.[4]

I choose the Navy-McNamara controversy over the decision to build the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA-67) as a conventionally-powered instead of a nuclear-powered vessel. There were several reasons for this choice, but the most important ones were that: 1) there has not been a great deal of scholarly (or even polemic) attention paid to the issue; and 2) it is one of the few issues on which McNamara later publicly changed his position. The first reason may be both a resultant of the second item and a result of (the existenee of) McNamara's decision to proceed with the deployment of the ABM, which is a more prominent and popular instance of McNamara, at least partially, reversing his position on a

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pretensions to being a critieal analysis.

4. This is a loose use of the term model, but I am using it in a roughly similar manner to the "academie" type model Abraham Kaplan (The Conduct of Inquiry. (Seranton: Chandler, 1964), p. 259) deseribes, and by which I am referring to the theory that McNamara was able to gain a firm grasp on the needs of national seeurity. That by means of cost/system analysis he was able to determine "How Mueh Is Enough." This "breakthrough" has enabled and encouraged the influx of a great number of flexible, brilliant minds into the field of national security. That these minds were heretofore held back by the ill-founded concept that the only people qualified to give military advice were people with experienee in the area. The "model" further implies that due to hierarehial stodgism the Services were too slow to learn new and better methods of determining national priorities, and thus they were (justifiably) left out in left field by a prophet (MeNamara) who was interested in getting the job done (i.e. getting the most seeurity for the eountry at the least cost), not in protecting historical (and obsoleseent) perogatives and relationships.

major issue. There is still an attraction to the nuclear-power-for-carriers decision however, because, unlike the ABM issue, the question of carriers as major weapon systems is still pertinent(as is the corollary question of nuclear power for major combatant surface ships), and, McNamara's change-of-heart on the carrier system was justified on the grounds of changes in the cost-effectiveness of carriers. Since there exists no study (as was done on the ABM)[5] which explains this change as due to bureaucratic factors (vice cost-effectiveness factors) we have a controversy which appears to be more easily explained by the "McNamara-era" model. In addition, the carrier propulsion controversy would appear to have primae facie interest, in that in a space of three years (1963-1966) Secretary McNamara made a complete reversal in his position on the question of nuclear power for carriers. From this fact alone, one would seem to be on firm ground in drawing the conclusion that either McNamara was completely wrong to begin with, or, the Navy reacted rather quickly (I would maintain that three years is the essence of bureaucratic quickness) to Secretary McNamara's new system. Since neither of these latter conclusions is consistent with the McNamara-era model, the carrier propulsion controversy acquires some singular discriminatory aura among the major controversies with which Mr. McNamara was associated.[6]

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5. Referring to Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," World Politics, 25, no. 1 (October 1972):62-95.

6. It is perhaps significant that Roherty is the only author who considered the carrier decision to be of significance, despite the fact that the issue received a great deal of coverage in all the major news magazines and newspapers. For example, Enthoven and Smith identify and discuss only "three controversial program decisions," the B-70, SKYBOLT and the TFX in their book (Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971)), and they avoid the real controversy in the latter by noting that--

> Unfortunately, we are not qualified to write a

As quickly became apparent during my research, the selection of an issue which has received relatively little academic interest does not necessarily mean that the subject itself is limited in scope. In fact, a major problem in discussing any issue which is felt to involve national defense, is that the bureaucratic actors and considerations become so myriad and complex that it is difficult to deal with in a paper of any reasonable size. Therefore, while I have attempted to provide the reader with an historical background for the controversy, and the issue

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> firsthand account of the main TFX decisions in the early 1960's which sparked much of the controversy. As has been made clear more than once in the public record, the Systems Analysis office was not involved in the early TFX decisions." (p. 262)

Their only comment on the carrier controversy (p. 325) is to use it as an example of the Services using President Kennedy's decision to not establish arbitrary budget ceilings as an excuse for the Services to avoid hard budget decisions themselves and to--

> flood OSD with proposals for more of everything.... As a result, the burden of choice in judging Service proposals rested almost entirely on the Secretary of Defense and his staff. And since the analysis of complex defense issues is almost never clear-cut and provable one way or the other, this meant that the pressure on the Secretary for continuous budget increases was very great.

The point is that McNamara's change of mind on the carrier issue made it not one of the better items to use in discussing the impact of the Secretary on the Defense Department, so the issue seems to have been largely ignored by the great majority of historians/writers who have been sympathetic to McNamara's general thrust.

It is also worthy of note, since I will later attempt to draw attention to the relationship between the two, that Enthoven was apparently making an attempt to disassociate the use of system analysis from the decisions on both the TFX and the carrier (see above quotes).

Finally, on the subject of the various controversies with which Mr. McNamara was associated, to my knowledge the only two on which he publically acknowledged a change of position were Vietnam, the ABM and nuclear power for the CVA-67. This in itself seems to imply that there is some value in the study of the latter as perhaps instructive on the former.

and goals as seen by several players, I have concentrated on attempting to determine and explain how the Navy, as represented by the Chief of Naval Operations, perceived the issue and evaluated the decisions. This limitation probably serves to impart a bias to the presentation, but if one is interested in determining the whole "truth," it appears necessary to begin by reading one aspect accurately. Since the various Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) during the 1960s were definitely major actors in the controversy, and since an evaluation of their positions is in itself a worthwhile undertaking, I have consciously applied this limitation.

It seems pertinent at this time to also note how I conducted my research. I first grounded myself in the secondary literature by reading discussions of Secretary McNamara's reign,[7] and on the history of National Strategy development, with particular emphasis on the part visualized for or carried out by the Navy.[8] I then reviewed the periodicals which

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7. Particularly Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968); the Enthoven and Smith book previously mentioned; Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); William W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970); James M. Roherty's previously cited book; and Henry L. Trewitt's McNamara. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

8. Including Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966); and by the same author, The Admirals Lobby. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967); R. G. Head and E. J. Rokke, American Defense Policy (3rd. ed.). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973); Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963. (Ohio State University Press, 1966); Harland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973); Urs Schwarz, American Strategy: A New Perspective. (New York: Doubleday, 1966); and Y. Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace. (Jerusalem: 1966).

dealt with the subject between the years 1958 to 1966, and the applicable Congressional Committee hearings for the same years.[9] Finally, I interviewed the men who had been the Chiefs of Naval Operations for the critical years of 1955-1967 and I interviewed the man who had been Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) for the last two years of the Eisenhower (pre-McNamara) presidency, for the first two years of Kennedy's. The VCNO had then held other responsible Navy billets throughout the remainder of the McNamara years.[10]

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Perhaps the best manner in which to start a discussion of the issue is to quote the author of the currently-accepted-most-accurate-explanation of the controversy as to his impressions of the Navy position on the question as to whether the KENNEDY should be nuclear-powered--

> (T)he Navy did not enter into the fray with its customary assuredness....there was noticeable ambivalence in the Navy attitude toward nuclear propulsion....the Navy had allowed a doctrinal gap to develop with respect to the utilization of attack carriers...in likely post-World War II scenarios.[11]

If Rourke is correct in his evaluation, then what possible explanations are there for the Navy attitude?

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9. Specifically the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees hearings on Military Posture and the Appropriations bills for the years 1958 through 1967, plus the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for the year 1963 and 1966 through 1971.

10. The CNOs were Admirals Arleigh Burke (1955 to 1961), George Anderson (1961 to 1963) and David McDonald (1963 to 1967). The VCNO was Admiral James Russell (1958-1961) who later was COMSOUTH (in Naples) from 1962 to 1965, and then was recalled to active duty in 1967-8. Paraphrasions of these interviews are contained in Appendices A through D.

11. Roherty, op. cit., pp. 141-2. Roherty is considered the authority on this issue, by default, in addition to his instructive analysis.

I would propose that there are three likely explanations. First, there is the McNamara-era model which postulates that the Navy was overwhelmed by the sophistication of the cost-effectiveness work being done by the System Analysis staff of Secretary McNamara, and was organizationally and temperamentally unable to adapt in time to become effective as an organizational actor. Secondly, there is the possibility (which is also suggested by Roherty) that the Navy simply misjudged the situation--that the Navy had a sufficiently good case for nuclear power (with the Congress) to enable them to force the Secretary's hand and achieve nuclear propulsion for the CVA-67, but they just didn't realize it (their political "sense" was inaccurate or inadequate). A third possibility is that the issue was not important to the Navy, at least not as important as other goals.

Rather than trying to specifically prove or disprove any of these suppositions, I intend to discuss what I feel happened, and then return to this question of whether or not Dr. Roherty has correctly diagnosed the causes of the symptons he has (correctly) identified as being superficially unexplained by the Navy actions.

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In order to understand the historical framework in which some of the major actors may have regarded the carrier controversy, it seems worthwhile to review a little bit of United States military/strategic history. With respect to national strategy, some editorializing can save a great deal of time. When one examines many histories of national strategic thinking,[12] I suggest that one almost invariably is struck by the impression that any successful national strategic policy had to display rather specific characteristics--it had to be the cheapest policy available which could be accepted as rational by the general populace. Included in the latter portion of the requirement was the assumption that the policy could be reduced to terms assimilatable by a great number of relatively unsophisticated (in this area) citizens. In effect, all one is saying is that for a citizen to politically support a particular national defense strategy, it must require the least possible sacrifice on his part (and I would propose that the citizen (at least) subconsciously performs a trade-off analysis of definite personal money costs versus potential personal life costs), and the policy must be at least superficially rational.

It almost seems impossible to emphasize the importance of the cost factor. The historical oceanic insulation of the American continent from the maelstrom of European conflict, and the oppressive political burden which peacetime defense spending appears to inevitably become, seems to suggest a Gresham Law of strategic theory, in which the cheaper theory prevails in spite of any shortcomings (which are generally expensive to compensate for).

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12. Particularly the previously cited Schwarz and Davis books.

If these generalizations are correct, one would expect that in those instances in which one strategic defense theory was both cheaper and simpler (to understand) than any others being promoted, one would see that particular defense theory become extremely dominant and prosper at the expense of all other theories. One can further extrapolate and anticipate that not only would this be expected, one can also expect that it would be impossible to unseat this dominant theory (unless one could develop a cheaper one) unless some perceived valid threat to the country's security forced a reexamination. If you will accept the validity of this summary of the primary characteristics of American strategic theory, then it appears useful to draw some conclusions about the possible results, particularly with respect to the military services, of these circumstances. I would theorize that in those eras in which one particular strategic theory was both less expensive and more easily understood than any other, that particular theory would become dominant. Since inexpensive theories are inevitably those which do not require the complete panoply of military services, in our divided service organization, one service is almost certain to feel that its prominence (relative to the other service(s)) is being slighted.[13] It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the service being slighted either sincerely

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13. A scholarly investigation has determined what many who have worked in the Pentagon have sensed--

> In some instances according the services more (or less) funds is related to a change in behavior....we have found that the amount of money involved is not necessarily the most important consideration. For some areas the important thing is how the money is distributed among the services.

Charles Herbert Longley, "Politics in the Pentagon: A Study of Contemporary Civil-Military Relations." (Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Chapel Hill, 1960), p. 208.

believes, or can convince itself that it sincerely believes, that the strength of America's national security is in some manner directly related to the strength of the particular service with which one is associated.[14] Therefore, one would expect that periods of dominant strategic theory would tend to be ones of interservice rivalry, as one of the services would feel that its relative diminuation of power not only threatened the existence of the service, but also threatened the security of the nation. This is not, of course, to say that one would not expect interservice rivalry in those eras in which one particular national security policy was not dominant, for in all probability the different services would then be advocators of competing theories, but, no service would feel that its existence was being both pragmatically threatened and theoretically justified.

With this introduction, one can look at the history of American strategic thought in this century. The post-World War I era was one of dominance for the "Blue Water" theory. This was the "strategy" that the United States could take advantage of the expansive oceanic barriers, and avoid the maintenance of an expensive force under arms. By constructing a Navy (of minimal size since any potential enemy would have to operate so far from their base of supply), the nation's safety would be assured. In the event of impending invasion, the Navy would form up (they were not normally operated as a fleet in being, but instead homeported at separate locations on the coasts) and sally forth (in all probability toward the setting sun to meet the Japanese) in order to

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14. Which is only a little longer phrasing of "Where you stand depends

meet the enemy out on the broad expanse of the ocean.[15] The American continent and other areas covered by the Monroe Doctrine would not be threatened by the specter of war. It is worthy of note that this doctrine was not only inexpensive and simple to understand, but was also reconcilable with the American experience which had seen the two real threats to American security coming as a result of seaborne invasions in 1776 and 1812.

World War II marked the end of the dominance of the "Blue Water" theory. The development of the land-based strategic bomber and the American sole possession of the atomic weapon ushered in a new era. There no longer seemed to be any question as to whether or not land forces and naval vessels were extremely vulnerable to air attack (with a nuclear weapon). With the absence of the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy from the White House for the first time in more than a decade, one might expect the Navy to feel particularly vulnerable.[16]

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15. Although the ships were divided on one coast, the fleet was maintained in only one ocean until rapid access between the coasts was ensured, as can be seen by Theodore Roosevelt's 1909 letter to his successor:

> Dear Will: One closing legacy. Under no circumstances divide the battleship fleet between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans prior to the finishing of the Panama Canal.

which is printed in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), vol. VI, p. 1543, as quoted in Schwarz, op. cit., p. 21.

16. A not unjustified feeling given President Truman's special message to the Congress in December 1945 in which he confirmed that, unlike his predecessor of eight months past, Truman was in favor of "an overall military chief of staff to head the single department" and assigning the Navy's land-based aircraft to the new Air Force. See Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 38 and 55.

In the period of flux following World War II, the Services engaged in a fierce battle for theoretical dominance. The Army was determined not to permit the postwar army to again fall into such a state of disrepair as had occurred following World War I. The most practical method of preventing this was perceived to be the limiting of the Navy by achieving a voice in the Navy's budget proposals.[17] Thus the Army was in favor of unification of the Services.[18] The President was in favor of unification for completely different political goals, but his position (as evaluated by Caraley) is particularly noteworthy because the concept resurfaced in the late 1950s:[19]

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17. One must remember that prior to unification in 1947 the Secretaries of War and the Navy had no common superior except the President and questions as to the size of the respective budgets and programs were primarily determined by the respective Congressional committees.

18. Not only was the Army interested in gaining a check on the Navy's growth (through the Combined Chief of Staff, which would, given the relative sizes of the services, logically be an Army Officer), but also the Army was interested in checkmating the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps had undergone phenominal growth during World War II and at the end of the war, where there had been less than one division pre-war, there now stood six full divisions. In addition to these parochial irritations, the Army had not viewed with pleasure even operating with the Marines during the war, much less the fact that one of their generals had been relieved for cowardicy under fire by a Marine general. For a description of the ill-feeling see Careley, op. cit., pp. 66ff.

19. The tenor of the Congressional desire for strong leadership in the Defense Department can be seen in such documents as the U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, 85th Congress, 1st Session. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 704ff, particularly in the questioning of Representative Mahon as to the coordination of the Service requests. A comparison of the motive force behind the unification issue in the late 1940s and the Congressional request for increased centralization in the late 1950s is well summarized by Caraley, op. cit., p. 239--

> Except for the Army Pearl Harbor Board's report, General Marshall had not been publicly criticized during the entire war and it appears as if a scapegoat, even if it were an organizational form, had to be found on which to focus the blame and protect his and other generals' and admirals' reputations.* In

> Truman thought that a single cabinet officer over all the armed forces and single military budget, by presenting a common front to Congress, would maximize presidential control over the military establishment.[20]

The Army Air Corps saw unification (in which the Army and Navy were to be placed under one Secretary of Defense and simultaneously the Air Force would be created from the Army) as the only way in which "Air Power" would achieve its proper role as a military weapon.[21] The Navy feared unification not only because they were apprehensive of the Army gaining budgetary control over the Navy (through a single Chief of Staff of the Military), but also because the Air Corps was attempting to gain control of all air power which was not sea-based, a move that would have immediately sharply curtailed the Navy's air antisubmarine role (which

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> any event, from the fall of 1945 on--and probably until the present day--the idea that lack of unification "caused" the Pearl Harbor disaster had been accepted by a large part of the general public as an article of faith to be challenged only by the Navy obstructionists...
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> *Similarly, America's failure to match the Soviet achievements in space and missile efforts in 1957 was widely attributed not to incorrect policy decisions at the highest level but to inadequate defense organization and led to proposals for change in the Department of Defense to "eliminate interservice rivalries."

20. Caraley, op. cit., p. 85.

21. In the years immediately following World War I, the Navy and the Army air forces had bureaucratically developed along very dissimilar lines. The Naval Air contingent had rapidly achieved autonomy and recognition within the Navy and was well satisfied with its position withing the service. The Army Air Service/Corps/Forces, on the other hand, did not achieve autonomy until just prior to World War II, and did not feel that their true potential could be realized while and if they remained a part of the Army. For an excellent comparison of the differences in development see Davis, Lobby, op. cit., pp. 60-100.

was primarily carried out by land-based aircraft), and which would have established a precedence for an Air Force take-over of all the Navy aircraft.[22]

The other essential element of the unification controversy which was to reappear during the McNamara era was the public interest which succeeded in maintaining political interest in the unification issue:

> There is...little reason to doubt that in the unification conflict the most widely shared public interests involved were "combat effectiveness" and "economy."....Another...public interest appears to have been "civilian control of the military"...as the feeling that professional military officers should not have undue influence over national policy.[23]

The success of the unification proponents in 1947 was due to several bureaucratic factors, not the least of which was Secretary of the Navy Forrestal's decision to cut his (the Navy's) losses in the battle with the President and accept the inevitable (with the assurance of Congressional protection of the naval aviators and the marines). Another critical factor was the change in political leadership (democrats to republicans) which effectively removed the most anti-unification Congressmen from effective positions of power.[24]

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22. If the Navy had lost their land and sea based air power, they would have been stripped of forty per cent of their officers and the great majority of their force projection capability. For data on the percentage of naval officers who were aviators see Davis, Postwar Defense, op. cit., p. 127. With respect to force projection, one should realize that the Navy had ended World War II convinced of the value of the airplane as the primary fleet force projection weapon. Probably the best demonstration of that concept is that the Navy had only one ship with large (eight-inch) guns in commission at the end of the Vietnam war.

23. Caraley, op. cit., p. 277. Although I do not consider it significant, it should be noted that I have omitted the phrase "though somewhat less certain" that is between "Another" and "public interest appears to..." in the original.

24. See the discussion in Caraley, op. cit., pp. 256ff. and Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 250-286.

As the Defense Department budget continued to decline during the post-war years and the "massive-air-deterrent" theory gained more and more popularity, the Navy felt itself to be severely threatened. Only two years following the unification controversy, which could probably be claimed as a "no decision" contest (i.e. draw) by Navy supporters, the Navy's role in the national defense and their air power capability were again under attack.[25] The question centered around the Navy's plans to build a flush-deck carrier (one without an Island) which would be large enough to carry the planes which themselves were large enough to carry the immense atomic weapons. The Navy had felt that this new "super-carrier" was so vital to their plans that they had volunteered to cancel thirteen other ships which were in various stages of construction in order to fund the supercarrier out of the Navy's assigned ship construction funds. Unfortunately for the Navy, ex-Naval aviator, ex-Secretary of the Navy, and current Secretary of Defense Forrestal died. One month later, his replacement, Louis Johnson, announced, five days after the keel had been laid, the cancellation of the supercarrier (and the additional loss to the Navy of the thirteen ships) in order to fund an increase in the number of Air Force strategic bombers (B-36s).[26]

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25. In the strategic era following World War I, the Army Air Service had attacked the Navy as being no longer relevant to an age which had a tactical bombing capability. "(T)he doctrine held...that the airplane had rendered obsolete all military forces designed to fight on the earth's surface." Davis, Lobby, op. cit., p. 29. For an excellent account of this era, including the Navy's objections to various Air Corps "tests" of surface ship vulnerability, beginning with Mitchell's verbal attack on the Indiana (the charges had been placed by hand), see Charles M. Melhorn, "Lever for Rearmament: The Rise of the Carrier," (Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of California at San Diego, 1973), particularly pp. 126-138.

26. The accepted definitive account of this period is the 103 page "article" by Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," in American Civil-Military Decisions, Harold Stein (ed.). (Birmington: University of Alabama Press, 1963).

The Navy reacted by attacking the Air Force B-36 program, both in public and via the Congress in the well-known "Revolt of the Admirals." The results of this controversy with the Secretary of Defense over the advantages of sea-based versus land-based strategic airpower were disastrous for the Navy. Not only was the Navy unable to reverse the Secretary's decision, and therefore lost not only the supercarrier, but also the total building program for 1949, but in addition they lost a pro-Navy Secretary of the Navy and saw him replaced by one who was definitely the Secretary of Defense's man,[27] Following the unsuccessful revolt, the Secretary of Defense retaliated by firing not only those Admirals who had taken a public position in the "Revolt," but also those, including the CNO, Admiral Denfield, who had only disagreed with the Secretary within proper channels.

It was a resounding demonstration of not only the power of the Secretary of Defense (in 1949!!!), but also the dominant position of the Air Force in conjunction with the dominance of the theory that land-based strategic air power was cheaper than sea-based strategic air power, and that strategic air power was all that was necessary to attain the United States security requirements.[28] Possibly the person who was in the best

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While the cancellation of the carrier and the beefing up of the number of Air Force B-36 air groups were not directly related by any of the major Defense Department (as opposed to Navy) participants, the fact that they were linked in actuality can be seen by Hammond's title.

27. The fact that the Secretary of Defense had made the decision without giving the Navy a chance to reclaim (shades of the TFX!), and a description of the shipbuilding sacrifices made by the Navy to fund the supercarrier are contained in Johnson's resignation letter as quoted in Hammond, op. cit., p. 494.

28. "In criticizing the navy's carrier program (Clarence) Cannon (chairman of the House appropriations committee) argued that the House should put 'money in the only place that counts, and that is on long-range, land-based bombers.' Cannon based his support for more strategic air power on the assumption that a third world war would be short, precluding

place to observe all of this was a Navy captain--Arleigh Burke, who was in the midst of the Navy coordination of the "revolt's" Congressional testimony, and who, in retaliation for that assignment, was personally removed from that year's Admirals selection list by the Secretary of Defense.[29] Since Admiral Burke was to be the Chief of Naval Operations when McNamara arrived to work his revolution, one might surmise that he was already fully aware of both the Secretary's power and the problems

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any need to spend larger sums on army or navy preparedness." Kolodziej, op. cit., p. 103.

Cannon was to remain a constant critic of the Navy carrier program, and his position in the Congress continued to give weight to his thoughts. It does not seem unreasonable to propose that he was attracted to the idea of the primacy of the Air Force because of his dislike of Federal spending, for he was famous for his economies. Newsweek magazine presented the following sketch of him--

> Missouri Democrat who was first elected to the House in 1923, has been chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee since 1941...a man who has dedicated his legislative life to cutting the Federal budget...has never hesitated to fight for economy even with his fists... (13 May 1957, p. 34).

At the same time, his dislike of the Navy has prompted attempts to explain his feelings as due to other factors--

> Cannon himself has not taken a junket since his trip to Europe in the fall of 1947, when he came down with a ferocious toothache in Athens. He hunted up a United States Navy dentist, but in the excitement the luckless medic nervously pulled the wrong tooth. Cannon has taken a dim view of the Navy ever since.

(Paul F. Healy, "Nobody Loves Clarence," The Saturday Evening Post, 25 March 1950, p. 132).

29. Hammond, op. cit., pp. 546-8, describes the "purge" that followed the hearings, despite the House Armed Services Committee's Chairman's specific warning against such action. He notes that Burke was placed back on the list due to Republican Congressional pressure.

extant in attempting to fight the Air Force head on with respect to the merits of land versus sea-based air power.[30]

The Navy appears to have escaped further immediate deterioration (both real and relative) by the beginning of the Korean War,[31] but her position in 1950 was drastically different from her position at the end of World War II. First of all the Navy had lost the position of being the service whose budget requests were looked on with favor in Congress because the public viewed the services mission as the cheapest (and thus the first line of) means of obtaining sufficient defense. In fact, the Air Force budget was now more than 50% of the total DoD request. While the Korean War may have demonstrated to some that the concept of massive retaliation was not a completely reliable concept, the latter still had a wide following.[32] Concurrently, the carrier weapons system had been

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30. Although this is not necessarily so. Admiral Russell noted that Burke was not at all inhibited by the events of 1949 (Appendix D, Answer #2). But it does seem at least worthy of comment that Burke was not to cross swords with McNamara publicly, and neither did Admiral McDonald, who had been the Naval aide to the Under Secretary of the Navy (Dan Kimbal) during the period of the "Revolt" and had been deeply involved in Congressional liason. The CNO who did challenge McNamara head-on (to the detriment of the Navy) was the one of the three who had not seen the "Revolt" and the aftermath from close-up, but who had been isolated (in school at the National War College) during the events. (For Admiral Anderson's biography, see Congressional Record for 22 Aug. 1961, Appendix, P. A6570, which is a reprint of an August 1961 article in SHIPMATE.).

31. Hammond, on. cit., pp. 502ff, lists Secretary Johnson's FY 1951 plans as including a 50% cut in the Navy carrier forces and air groups, with less drastic (but substantial) cuts in other ship categories.

32. John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (6th ed.; New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 104-5, explains this apparent anomaly thusly:

> This reliance upon strategic air power was...expected to appeal to the American public. In the first place, "massive retaliation" simply sounded more dynamic than containment; at the same time, it made possible a reduction of over-all military expenditures. It was obviously considerably cheaper to concentrate military spending upon a one-weapon

shown to be vulnerable to successful attack by those who felt that other items should take priority. The Secretary of Defense's well-publicized success in striking the carrier gave renewed hope to all those who either opposed the carrier or supported another budget item. Another factor which would prove terribly significant during the 1960s, but which was practically overlooked in the events of 1949 was that in the same budget from which the supercarrier had been struck, the first funds for the supersubmarine (USS NAUTILUS) were included. These nuclear submarines would prove to be so capable in both the tactical and (when combined with the Polaris missile) strategic field that they would gain an overwhelming number of Congressional adherents, but they would prove to be so expensive (ten times the cost of a conventionally-powered submarine) they would cause the Navy a great deal of pain. While these latter remarks may be getting somewhat ahead of my paper, perhaps it does seem appropriate to point out again that the loss of the supercarrier had been coupled with the loss of practically the entire surface ship building program, and that when this happened again in the early sixties in the controversy over nuclear power, the parallel may have caused some Naval personnel some remorse.[33]

> system than to build up and maintain large balanced forces to meet any contingency. The second appealing feature of massive retaliation was that it, in fact, rejected the concept of limited war, or "half war," and reasserted the old American doctrine of either abstaining or fighting an all-out war. This return to the more traditional American approach to war was natural in 1952. The Republicans had been elected largely because of the deep popular revulsion against the Korean War; it was clear that the people wanted no more Koreas.

33. None of the people interviewed drew this parallel, however, it should be pointed out that all the people interviewed except Burke were aviator officers and would be expected to be primarily oriented toward recognition of the problems existent in the Naval Air community. Perhaps

In order to discuss McNamara's period in office, it is also necessary to provide some background on the rest of the events of the 1950s following the Korean war. The period demonstrated at least three separate trends. The first years (1952-54) were marked by Congressional interest in insuring that the Defense Budget was reduced as much as possible in order to limit the amount of "waste and inefficiency" and in order to "guard against economic collapse."[34] This reaction produced the expected reaction with respect to the Navy appropriations, for Representative Cannon was successful in killing the supercarrier request in the FY 1953 budget.[35]

The second phase was the "New Look" which Eisenhower unveiled in his FY 1955 budget request and which effectively used a reliance upon tactical and strategic nuclear weapons to justify the maintenance of the desired defense spending ceilings, and which resulted in the relative decrease of expenditures for the Army, as the Navy carrier air wings

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this is an unwarranted extension of his remarks, but it seems possible to read the second paragraph of Burke's answer (Appendix (A)) to question #1 and his answer to question #2 as displaying some impatience with the fact that the Navy was maneuvered into a position with McNamara in which, as under Johnson a decade earlier, surface ships had been sacrificed to build a carrier which was then never built. One must realize that despite some claims to the contrary (see paragraph three of footnote number six for Enthoven's comment) the services had already made choices between weapons systems before the budgets were presented to the Secretary. For a discussion of the specific ship sacrifices which the Navy had decided upon in order to fund the requested follow-on to the Enterprise (the next nuclear-powered carrier) see L. Edgar Prina, "Navy to Fight for Nuclear Carriers," Washington Star, 30 November 1958, p. 1.

34. A good analysis of these years is contained in Kolodziej, op. cit., pp. 124-324. The quote is from the same source, p. 156.

35. This supercarrier request was for a second one, as the Navy had gotten their first supercarrier, now officially designated the CVA (attack heavy carrier), during the Korean War budget of FY 1951. The ship had been named the USS FORRESTAL and the supercarrier class thus became the Forrestal class. The idea of the angled deck had superceded the concept of a "flush deck."

were accepted as having a strategic strike capability which would supplement the Air Force's.[36] The third phase of the Eisenhower years was the post-Sputnik era. The launching of the Sputnik on 4 October 1967 produced a complete reorientation in the public and congressional view of the proper size of the Defense budget. There appears to be a great deal of evidence that in the absence of prompt Executive branch action to reassure the American people on the question of national defense, the Democrats in Congress, under the leadership of Senator Lyndon Johnson and Represenative Sam Rayburn, seized the opportunity to use the issue of the Defense budget for the 1958 and 1960 elections.[37]

Unfortunately for the Navy carrier advocates, the question of whether or not the carrier was a cost-effective weapons system was still an issue with the Congress. Despite the fact that the Navy "acceded to President Eisenhower's suggestion that the carrier be conventional rather than nuclear-powered, as a money-saving consideration,"[38] the House Defense Appropriations subcommittee (under Mahon) and committee (under Cannon) refused to provide funds for construction in debate on both the

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36. See Kolodziej, op. cit., p. 189. Note that the Air Force's fears of the inevitable result of the loss of Air Force wings as a result of the Navy acquisition of an atomic weapon delivery capability were proven to be accurate fears by the first Eisenhower budget of the "New Look."

In his account of the development of the Navy capability, Vincent Davis appears to be of two minds as to whether or not the interservice rivalry had a significant effect upon the Navy development. In The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases. (Denver: University of Denver, 1967) Davis maintains that Commanders (later Admirals) Ashworth and Hayward would have gone ahead with this development without the service rivalry, but he fails to adequately explain how they would have developed the "vertical alliances" within the Navy without the pressure of the Air Force competition. On the other hand, in Postwar Defense, op. cit., pp. 224-5, Davis notes that the intra-service rivalry had a "decisive" effect upon the development of the Navy's capability.

37. Kolodziej, op. cit., pp. 272ff.

38. Jack Raymond, "House Group Bars Aircraft Carrier," The New York Times, 15 May 1959, p. 7.

FY 1960 and FY 1961 appropriations bills. The difficulty the Navy faced in obtaining any type of carrier can be best seen by noting Representative Cannon's identification of the carrier as singlehandedly responsible for the decline of the United States as a world power.[39] Faced with this opposition, plus the continual sniping by Admiral Rickover as to any decision to build a conventionally-powered carrier,[40] plus renewed

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39. This remarkable speech, contained in the Congressional Record for the House for 4 August 1959 (Vol. 105, Part 12, pp. 15105-6) is reminiscent of Cannon's objections to the carrier during the 1949 controversy. It is also indicative of the House's attitude toward the carrier in the period immediately before the McNamara era (see Admiral Russell's comment in response to question #5 (Appendix (D)), and Admiral Burke's answer #2 (Appendix (A)). For both of these reasons some of the speech is quoted herewith:

"(T)here is one fact that stands out like the headlight on a locomotive at midnight.

It cannot be denied. It cannot be evaded. It cannot be palliated.

It cannot be hidden. It stands out stark and grim and menacing against every horizon.

Since 1945 the United States has steadily declined in relative military strength as a world power....as a result of that growing weakness we have every year less ardent friends and more agressive enemies.

But the situation is more alarming than that.

Every year since 1945 Russia has steadily grown in relative military strength as a world power....(Following World War II) we did not confer with Germany or Japan on the terms of surrender. We did not meet in any conferences at Geneva. We did not hold any meetings at the summit, we did not leave unsettled the status of any American national as a prisoner of war. We did not have brush fires....what has brought about this remarkable change?....It is very simple....One thing and one thing alone ....We have frittered away on carriers the time and attention and money we should have devoted to the missile and the submarine....(Why) America has dropped every year in relative military power and Russia has risen every year in world priority....There can be no other explanation. It is as simple as that. It is the carrier....(Funding of carriers will not) keep the Russians out of the United States."

40. Rickover was the unrelenting author of statements on the value of spending money on conventional carriers such as "You know darn well that to buy an obsolescent ship is stupid," reported in the New York Times, 28 May 1959, p. 60.

Admiral Russell described the effect of this uncoordinated (Navy) policy as being "The primary problem we were having in Congress was that they wouldn't vote for the carrier requests unless it was nuclear-powered and we couldn't get it through the Secretary as nuclear-powered." (Appendix (D), Answer #5). Admiral Burke, following his own personal poll of the Congress, determined that the votes were there for a conventional carrier, but not for the added cost of nuclear power (Appendix

questions (encouraged if not sponsored by the Air Force) of carrier vulnerability to air strikes,[41] it does not seem surprising that it took at least two years of trying to get just one carrier past the Congress in the last years of the Eisenhower presidency (after the Democrats gained control of Congress).

It seems reasonable to summarize the situation with respect to carriers and nuclear power upon the entry of Secretary McNamara into office. With the exception of one year of grace during the Korean War, each carrier appropriation request since World War II had faced stiff opposition within the Defense Department from both the Air Force and the Army.[42] The primary questions that were continually brought up against

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(A), answer #1). Perhaps it is correct to say that ~~the~~ Navy people were not at all sure that they could get any carrier through Congress in the late Eisenhower years, and were not quite agreed on the optimum packaging (power plant, size, etc.) that would best aid passage. For a reference to the indecision on size (whether or not a smaller carrier would be better received) see the Washington Star, 7 January 1959, p. 29.

41. The question of vulnerability received new attention in early 1960 after the Defense Department conducted exercises/tests in which the Air Force Tactical Command was pitted against the Navy's Second Fleet. An event of such magnitude (and importance to the respective services) could not remain secret long and what appear to be self-serving leaks from both sides soon appeared in the press. For example, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "Rough Seas for Carriers," The New York Times, 26 January 1960, p. 19.

For Congressional interest in the vulnerability issue see the testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on the Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, op. cit., pp. 671ff., and for 1959 (85th Congress, 2nd Session), pp. 524ff.

42. It is worthwhile to review the cause of this difference of opinion between the services, because there had been a change in the interests of one participant since 1949. The Air Force still opposed the carrier because they felt that land-based air was less expensive and more effective than sea-based air. The Army, however, had become sensitized to the relatively new danger Russian submarines posed to troop carriers and logistic support supply lines. The Navy's inability to claim either to itself or to others that the solution to the anti-submarine was in hand, led many people to call for increased orientation of Navy funds from the offensive-minded carriers to defensive-capable antisubmarine forces.

For an expression of Congressional sentiment upon the occasion in 1960 of turning down the Navy/DoD's request for an Aircraft carrier, and

the carrier were the ones as to its vulnerability to air attack, and whether or not the money could not be better spent within the Navy in the area of anti-submarine warfare or for the purchase of more Polaris forces.[43] In addition, as of the late 1950s, the question of nuclear power became a double-edged sword as far as the Navy was concerned, because if it really were so good for submarines, weren't carriers that weren't nuclear-powered simply out of date before they were floated. The real "problem" with carriers in the late fifties and early sixties appears to have been the same problem that became apparent in 1949--not only were they a big juicy item, they were vulnerable to attack from all interested actors who felt they needed money. In Washington that's like throwing blood to piranhas to whet their interest.

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increasing appropriations for anti-submarine forces, see the House of Representatives Report No. 408, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1960. 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 60-1.

For a popular expression of the same sentiment by an Officer who came to have some impact upon the upcoming administration, see Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 100--

> With regard to the Navy, the Army....views the Navy carrier program as unjustifiably large, while favoring primary attention to the antisubmarine warfare program.

In addition, it should be noted that the ASW (anti-submarine warfare) mission did not compete with any Air Force or Army mission and therefore may have been looked upon by them as a good job for the Navy.

43. The first Polaris patrol had been made in mid-1960.

In order to discuss the issue from what is hopefully a different perspective, it is first necessary to ensure that a common interpretation of the original events has been established. The following is an attempt to establish just such a common knowledge of the events which surrounded the CVA-67 controversy.[44] After the two year hiatus in carrier construction which occurred after Sputnik, a conventional carrier (the USS America) was approved by the Congress in 1961, and concurrent with the inclusion of a carrier in the FY62 budget request, the Navy and Mr. McNamara agreed on an every other year construction program for Forrestal (non-nuclear) carriers through 1970.[45] At the same time, the CNO directed Adm. Rickover to begin work on a reactor design which would be less expensive.[46] Within a year, the Navy and AEC had succeeded in

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44. There are not many explanatory discussions of the events of the controversy, and there are none that adequately covers the events. In addition to the Roherty one which has already been cited, there are two excellent articles in news magazines: Luther J. Carter, "Nuclear Carriers: Studies Convince the Skeptics," Science, 18 March 1966, pp. 23ff.; and "The Navy Gets a Go-Ahead for Nuclear Carriers," in National Observer, 7 March 1966. The most Comprehensive overview of the public record is that provided by Congress in their Hearings on the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1967-68, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 90th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, (Washington: GPO, 1968). For an account of the controversy in 1963, Hearings on Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 88th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: GPO, 1964) is invaluable.

45. See the article by Jack Raymond, "Navy Supported in Carrier Drive, Pentagon Would Build Super Vessel Every 2 Years," New York Times, 25 November 1961, in which he discloses the building program which McNamara had approved for the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).

46. "I sent word to Rickover that I couldn't justify an eight reactor carrier, and that he should get busy and design a modern plant which would cost less and would be less complicated." (Appendix (B), answer #1). It should be noted that the Enterprise had had eight separate reactors (actually they were paired and operated with only four separate primary plants). The design which will be suggested for the CVA-67 only required four reactors, as each new reactor was more powerful. The design which was finally approved for use in the Nimitz (authorized in FY67) was a two reactor one. The question of savings that was involved in each change had to do with the reduction in the duplicative equipment (both primary and secondary propulsion equipment) as the power-generating

producing a design which would in effect halve the costs of nuclear power (in comparison with the Enterprise), and, perhaps even more importantly, the Navy had gained a great deal of operational experience with the Enterprise operating in normal peacetime maneuvers and under Alert 1 (the Cuban Missile Crisis) conditions both by itself, in coordination with an all nuclear task force, and in comparison with a conventional carrier of the Forrestal class.[47] The Navy in conjunction with the AEC and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy thus asked Mr. McNamara for permission to change the propulsion package on the CVA-67 to nuclear power in order to take advantage of the new technical achievements and operational experience. McNamara noted that the advantages claimed by the Navy--

> (D)epend on the assumption that the future Navy will, indeed, make full use of nuclear power. It is precisely this question which lies at the heart of the matter; far more so than the question of whether CVA-67 itself should or should not be nuclear powered.
>
> Accordingly, I should like you to undertake a comprehensive quantitative study of this matter....As a general guide, I am interested in achieving the most efficient possible naval forces, defining efficiency

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density of the nuclear reactors were increased, and the reduction in maintenance costs (attributed to refueling) and the cheaper cost of fuel that was inherent in longer core-life reactors.

47. The Enterprise had been part of a task force commanded by VADM John T. Hayward, an officer who had earned a great deal of respect in the Navy and the civilian community due to his drive (he had progressed from batboy to the Yankees through a seaman in the Navy to his current rank), his practical (see footnote #36) and academic (he had earned a doctorate in solid state physics) accomplishments, and his pleasant personality. For his very effective testimony in favor of nuclear power, a testimony that finished his career in the Navy as far as McNamara was concerned, see the 1963 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy JCAE Hearings, op. cit., pp. 49-68.

as achieving the most beneficial military results for a given expenditure.[48]

McNamara rejected the first Navy study as not being sufficiently detailed[49] and requested that it be redone. This time the Navy took six

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48. SECDEF to SECNAV memo of 22 February 1963 reprinted in 1963 JCAE Hearings, op. cit., p. 231. The request was for a study of considerable breadth, involving not only the question of nuclear power for all ships of the task force and the logistic support forces, but also how the nuclear Navy was to be deployed, how the Fleet administration was to be changed, how nuclear design questions were to be handled and the implications on nuclear power on the reduction of the number of ships in the fleet.

It is difficult to read the directive without the suspicion that at least some of the questions were asked because the Navy reaction was expected to be highly negative (particularly on the question as to the changes in deployment and administration of the Fleets and how the number of naval ships could be reduced by going to nuclear power).

A more presentimentive individual might have seen that the result was preordained by the manner in which the question was stated, for there was no conceivable way in which the Navy could afford to "make full use of nuclear power," and if McNamara felt that the Navy's case was dependent upon the validity of that assumption, the case for nuclear propulsion for the carrier was lost before the battle of cost analysis was joined.

49. The Navy reply was contained in SECNAV to SECDEF memo of 4 April 1963 (reprinted in 1963 JCAE Hearings, op. cit., pp. 231ff.) and was certainly a rapid reply given the scope of the request; however, one sees the final statement in the request "Please advise me when the study referred to above can be completed" and remembers the fact that McNamara had informed the AEC and the Congress that the question was being pursued "as a matter of urgency" and "high priority." See SECDEF to AEC memo of 2 February 1963 (reprinted in 1963 JCAE Hearings, op. cit., p. 81), and DDR&E memo to Chairman, JCAE of 18 March 1963 (reprinted in same publication, p. 3).

Perhaps the fact that McNamara considered the Navy reply so inadequate (SECDEF memo to SECNAV of 20 April 1963, reprinted in 1963 JCAE Hearings, op. cit., pp. 240ff.) does not reflect the fact that SECDEF was changing his requirements for the study, but only that communications between McNamara and Korth had completely broken down. Neither of these interpretations would appear to give the Navy much encouragement in their quest for nuclear power for the carrier.

As a note for those who have not spent much time either working or observing the inner workings of a bureaucratic organization such as the Defense Department, it is my observation that one does not write a memorandum (particularly an unclassified one) to one's immediate boss (as McNamara was to Korth) unless you know: 1) that he agrees with you and expects you to make a formal statement for the record; 2) that he will not be publicly embarrassed by your memo and will not find it diffiult for either you or him to accept or reject the recommendation

months to prepare the study and there is every indication that the effort was truly of the proportion that McNamara had requested. McNamara rejected the results of the latter study just in time to present the Congressional investigation on the matter with a fait acompli, and ordered that the Navy proceed with construction of the conventionally-powered carrier.[50] The Secretary of the Navy promptly resigned without

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matter of principle or some such other high-flown reason. This exchange of memos does not appear to meet any of these requirements, and would appear to cast some question on the working relationship between (at a minimum) Korth and McNamara.

50. SECNAV memo to SECDEF of 26 September 1963 forwarded the Navy's conclusions (see JCAE Hearings, op. cit., pp. 104ff.). The actual study was delayed and McNamara had not received it prior to his making his decision on 9 October to build the conventional carrier in order to avoid further delay since he was "confident that construction of the fiscal year 1963 carrier with conventional rather than nuclear power would not result in any serious loss in effectiveness." (JCAE, 1963, Hearings, op. cit., p. 244).

He had similarly not received the Navy study or reviewed any other by the time he testified before the JCAE on 13 November 1963 (Hearings, op. cit., pp. 167, 173, and 195).

There was considerable feeling on the part of some observers that McNamara's need for haste in making a decision was not due to a fear of further delay in laying down of the ship (see the history of keel laying dates following), but rather an attempt to defuse the issue in Congress (see Pastore's angry remarks in JCAE, 1963 Hearings, op. cit., p. 2; and John W. Finney, "McNamara Bars Nuclear Carrier Sought by Navy," New York Times, 26 October 1963, p. 1; "McNamara Faces Fight on the Carrier," New York Times, 4 November 1963, p. 22).

CVA	Hull No.	Authorized	Keel Laid
Forrestal	59	FY52	Jul 52
Saratoga	60	FY52	Dec 52
Ranger	61	FY54	Aug 54
Independence	62	FY55	Jul 55
Kitty Hawk	63	FY56	Dec 56
Constellation	64	FY57	Sep 57
Enterprise	65	FY58	Feb 58
America	66	FY61	Jun 61
Kennedy	67	FY63	Oct 64

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships

giving any reasons and McNamara appointed an old friend, Paul Nitze, to be the new Secretary.[51]

In his justification of his decision before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in November of that year, McNamara set the scene with a quote by Clarence Cannon on the usefulness of aircraft carriers and then discussed that he had decided (against nuclear power) because:

a. There was a greater need for land-based tactical air than for more expensive sea-based tactical air capability.[52]

b. There was a need for more ships (and the increased cost of nuclear power would prevent their construction).[53]

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51. Does the parallel with 1949 seem forced? For an account of Korth's resignation concurrent with his criticism of the carrier decision see "Pentagon Policy Scored by Korth," New York Times, 31 October 1963, p. 18.

52. JCAE, 1963 Hearings, op. cit., p. 157, McNamara recalled his priority list from his January 1962 testimony before the HAC, and said that it hadn't changed. His priority list was roughly:

1. Polaris and Minuteman
2. Increase in combat-ready army divisions
3. Antisubmarine warfare weapons
4. Torpedoes and iron bombs
5. Fighter aircraft for the Air Force
6. A carrier
7. Aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps

53. Ibid., pp. 159ff. Of particular interest is the problem McNamara had reconciling his concern for the effect of the high-cost nuclear carrier upon the remainder of the Navy's building program (i.e. there would not be enough money left to build smaller ships) with the Democratic policy of "no budget ceilings." McNamara did not succeed in convincing Congress that there was a discernable difference. As can be seen by examining Appendix (E), Congress had good reason to be skeptical. Particular attention is paid to the Procurement funds as the important ones (at least for the Navy and the Air Force), since those figures determine the hardware each service is allowed to buy, and thus its cutting edge. The most significant years to examine are 1962 and 1963, since the former was the last Eisenhower budget, and the latter was the first McNamara one produced by his "revolutionary" technique. While the technique may have been truly revolutionary, the results were anything but. As can be seen by comparing the two years, the Navy proportion of the total procurement budget remained the same (totals are not 100% as some of the budget was allocated to Departmental expenses (sedans, etc.,)).

c. The aircraft carrier was vulnerable.[54]

d. The attack aircraft carrier was of limited use in anti-submarine warfare.[55]

e. No studies of cost-effectiveness had convinced him that nuclear power was cost-effective, particularly since one of the "advantages" of the nuclear powered carrier was that since it was bigger (due to the increased diameter needed for the power plant), one could get another air squadron on board, and McNamara actually considered that a disadvantage! (?)[56]

The Navy position was that the nuclear-powered carrier was much more cost-effective than the conventionally-powered ship when one compared the costs of the entire weapons system (in other words, since the purpose is to provide tactical air power, the total cost of the weapons system includes the carrier, the air wing, the escorts, the logistics support ships, the base support, administrative costs, etc.), and there was

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procurement budget that was spent for ship construction and conversion significantly decreased, and only two-thirds of that decrease was due to a lesser strategic funding.

54. Ibid., p. 180. For an earlier attempt at what appears to be "news management" by McNamara's staff on the question of the carrier vulnerability, see "Pulling the Carrier's Plug," Time, (29 March 1963), p. 16.

55. JCAE, 1963 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 185ff.

56. Ibid., pp. 167ff. and p. 188. McNamara does not quote any cost-effectiveness study which he says that he had carefully read. He does offer an interesting comment on his position as to the usefulness of sea-based tactical air--

> Representative Bates. Would you pay any premium at all, 5, 10, 3 per cent for a differential in nuclear costs....?
>
> Secretary McNamara. ....(Did not answer the question asked, but noted instead)....The specific question is what kind of premium would I pay for a nuclear-powered carrier. In the first place, I would not want it to have another attack squadron on it. That is point No. 1. I would not pay anything for that. That cost in the CVAN-67 is fairly substantial.
>
> I don't know exactly what it is. But it is probably on the order of $30 million....I would not pay anything for that. (p. 188)

only about a 3% differential in favor of the conventional carrier. This differential was more than compensated for by the nuclear carrier's increased mobility capabilities, decreased refueling requirements (she still had to receive aviation gas, ammunition, and oil for any conventionally-powered escorts), the extra on-board space stowage for aviation fuel, the decreased dependence upon a logistic chain, the lesser maintenance required both on the propulsion plant and on the airplanes (due to the absence of stack gas residue), the increased safety (no exhaust stacks meant a smaller island and less air turbulence and increased visibility for landing pilots) and a more reliable propulsion plant.[57]

While the McNamara "systems analysis" position is not clear at the time of his decision in the fall of 1963, over the next few years it became evident that the Systems Analysis branch of the DoD (DoD/SA) agreed with the total cost concept but disagreed as to the method by which costs were computed. The DoD/SA approach was to charge the carrier cost with the extra squadron of planes which it was large enough to carry, and the cost of seven years of fuel, to use a rapid discount rate, to insist that the escorts must be nuclear also, and to use a scenario of peacetime refueling and wartime ammunition replenishment.[58] All of these factors favored the conventional carrier answer.

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57. Ibid., p. 104ff., (Second Navy study), for one source, or any Navy testimony from 1963-70. For an excellent summary of the subject from the Navy's point of view, see Admiral Rickover's testimony in the House Armed Service Committee, Hearings on Military Posture, 1966, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: GPO, 1966), pp. 8128ff.

58. The nuclear-powered carrier was estimated by DoD/SA to cost approximately $160 million more than a conventional carrier. Of that amount, $32M was for the cost of the cores which had an expected lifetime of seven years, but no costs were charged the conventional carrier for either the oil which would be used during that period, or the infrastructure necessary to provide that oil. $37M more was for the extra squadron of planes which the nuclear carrier could carry and the conventional one could not. (No increase in effectiveness was postulated for the increased

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's position remained rather constant throughout the controversy--given the life of the carrier as 30-odd years, it is wise to build a conventionally-powered ship that we will still be relying on in the year 2000? In addition, they were fearful that step improvements in the nuclear power for surface ship

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planes, just the increase in cost.

The discount rate is used in analysis to compensate for an increase in cost of buying the same capability at a future time (the rate of inflation). It tends to make the more expensive initial investment relatively even more expensive if the rate is set artificially high. These were. DoD/SA was using 10%/year for the aircraft carrier. This was a critical assumption, for the comparison was very sensitive to the actual discount rate used (that is, one can make either the conventional carrier or the nuclear one come out less expensive (assuming equal capabilities) depending on what one assumes for a discount rate)). Another critical cost assumption was for how long the capital investment was useful. Obviously, the longer the carrier was assumed to be useful, the less the differential in cost was per year, particularly since under the rules by which DoD/SA analysis was done, only the first ten years of cost were computed. In the OSD/SA analysis, the carrier was assumed to have depreciated 50% in the first ten years. Since the Navy was operating the carriers at full capacity for an average of 30+ years, the Navy disagreed with this critical assumption.

Obviously, increasing the number of ships in the task force which are nuclear-powered, increases the cost of the task force and thus the nuclear-powered carrier. It does not change the effectiveness part of the cost-effectiveness ratio because DoD/SA could not agree on anything that the nuclear carrier would do better that could be quantified, except for speed (and eventually oil usage). Since the conventional carrier could go as fast (the Navy had designed the reactors to produce the same speed as they were presently using), until they ran out of fuel, DoD/SA had only to think of a reason to minimize refueling time (the Navy can and does refuel at high speed as a normal course of action). This was accomplished by assuming that whenever the conventional carrier needed fuel, wherever in the world, an oiler would be instantly available. The Navy felt that this assumption ignored both practical logistics support and the problems of wartime contingencies.

For some discussion of these factors see Carter, op. cit.; the JCAE, 1963 Hearings, op. cit., p. IV, p. 37ff., p. 72, and particularly pp. 87-100; a classified memorandum from DoD/SA to SECNAV and SECAIR of 3 June 1968 signed by Mr. Enthoven, with the classified Navy reply Op-05W (Ser 00224P05) of 26 June 1968; and Joint Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittee, Hearings on the CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, 91st, 2nd., (Washington: GPO, 1970), pp. 299ff., and p. 296 for carrier operating lifetime.

For the final (SECDEF approved) cost analysis, see the SECNAV to SECDEF memo of 22 April 1966 on Nuclear Power for Surface Warships. A copy is included in Hearings, before the House Armed Services Committee

field (an area which served as a prototype for civilian reactor development) would lanquish unless some power plants were built and operated under other-than-simulated conditions.[59]

The issue was finally resolved in January 1966 when a request for a second nuclear carrier was included in the President's budget. McNamara gave as rationale for this new decision the reduced costs that now were possible due to the development of the two-reactor power plant for carriers which had finally made the nuclear carrier cost-effective.[60]

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on Military Posture, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (1966), pp. 8034-8096.

59. See the Chairman of the AEC, Dr. Seaborg's, testimony in JAEC, 1963 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 72ff., and Representative Bate's comments in 1966 HASC Military Posture Hearings, op. cit., p. 8006.

60. See U.S. Congress, Senate. Subcommittee on Armed Services of Appropriations Committee. Military Authorizations-Defense Appropriations, 1967. 89th Congress, 2nd Session, (S-2-19), pp. 326-7 for some pertinent testimony which includes the following:

> Senator Cannon. Will you explain to us why...you were able to convince us so ably last year (against the carrier) and why you have reversed your position this year.
>
> Secretary McNamara. ...I think it is 3 years ago....The additional construction costs for the larger carriers, plus the nuclear power, plus the additional aircraft, run to something on the order, if my memory serves me correctly, of $180 million....
>
> That carrier with a two-reactor power plant will be cheaper and more efficient than a four-reactor power plant, and on that basis I believe we are justified in recommending nuclear power now....
>
> Senator Cannon. At the time we were discussing this matter before, though, you indicated that the support ships would of necessity have to be nuclear-powered, as I recall.
>
> Secretary McNamara. No, sir. If I said that, I was in error. I don't believe I said that.
>
> Senator Cannon. That was my recollection....I mean the ships that go along with it.... (escort vessels)
>
> Secretary McNamara. It is not necessary for the escort vessels to be nuclear-powered. As I suggested, I am inclined to believe that it will not be desirable to provide nuclear-

Returning to the original question, it appears that there may be some value in investigating whether or not a bureaucratic[61] evaluation of the controversy might not provide some heuristic value. Despite James Roherty's comments, it doesn't appear completely clear that McNamara made his carrier decision on the basis of system analysis (cost-effectiveness) considerations. In fact, there are three specific reasons to believe that the decision was not ever related to this "new" science which became so important before McNamara's tenure was completed.[62] First of all, from Enthoven's discussion of the TFX and carrier controversies (footnote #6), it seems evident that OSD/SA was not involved in the decisions (I include the TFX decision because the time frame is so

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powered escorts for all nuclear-powered carriers.

Another source (Carter, op. cit.) credited two other system analysis techniques which the Navy had proposed. One was that the carrier should be evaluated as to effectiveness on the number of sorties launched and recovered per unit time (or before having to retire to be replenished with fuel and ammunition). This analysis had shown that the nuclear-carrier was more cost-effective (see first paragraph of footnote #58), and had probably resulted from the Enterprise's demonstrated 20% greater capability off the coast of Vietnam.

The second change in technique referenced was the consideration of the carrier as a forward floating airbase, and the reduction of the number of air wings to match the number of carriers actually in commission (not in overhaul) at any one time. This reduced the cost of the air wing (since airplanes are replaced at an average of every seven years, over the lifetime of the carrier, the cost of the air wing is about 80% of the cost of the entire task force), charged to each carrier (the "average" carrier) and also made the nuclear one more cost effective.

61. By which I am referring to the decision process described by Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) in which "the decisions and actions of governments are intranational political resultants...(a product of) compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence." (p. 162)

62. That the science is not as new or as uncommonly used in the Navy as many people believed can perhaps be shown by noting that the application of system analysis to Naval problems was a six-hour course at the United States Naval academy beginning in 1959 and had a rather distinguished career during World War II in all services. Naval Operations Analysis, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), p. v. "A History of Operations

similar (see chronology)) to any great extent. Secondly, Secretary McNamara's testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1963 gives the definite impression that not only have no comprehensive studies been done on the subject, but that the Secretary does not approve of any of the ones that have been done(footnotes #52 and #56). Perhaps even more significant is that, as one reviews McNamara's public statements on the issue, it becomes obvious that much of his dislike of the nuclear carrier proposal was shaped by preference for land-based tactical aircraft(rather than sea-based tactical aircraft). Since no study was performed which compared the two until after Mr. McNamara had left office,[63] it seems clear that McNamara was not basing that preference (or perhaps a better word is "feel") on any systematic analysis.[64]

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63. To the best of my knowledge, the first study done on the subject is the classified one referenced in footnote #58, the (unclassified) title of which is "The Relative Cost of Land-Based and Sea-Based Tactical Air Forces." After reading the related correspondence and revised studies which were done on the subject between June 1968 and February 1970, I am of the opinion that the study of 3 June 1968 was the very first time it had been done. I make that assessment because of the "roughness" (i.e. so many items done by OSD/SA which were inaccurate and on which they immediately backed down when challenged by the Navy analysts) of the study at that date. I have also made inquiries with negative results as to previous studies on this subject. It is worthy of note that OSD/SA, the Navy and the Air Force were unable to come to final agreement on various cost factors (neither would accept what was not beneficial to their own case), despite direction to do so, and even after forming a joint study group which included the Financial Management (civilian) Assistant Secretaries of both the Navy and the Air Force.

The primary analyst responsible for the study (Mr. H. Rosenzweig) moved to Brookings and attempted to get them to publish his study (which is strongly anti-Navy), after he was not successful in DoD after McNamara's left. It is that same study which provided the basic information for the Senator's Mondale and Case attack on the CVAN-70, op. cit., and a discussion of the basic issues can be found on pp. 223ff. The basic Navy position is found on pp. 75-6, while what appear to be the pro-Air Force (anti-Carrier) questions are primarily those asked by Senator Symington on pp. 126ff.

64. Perhaps this is as good a place as any to note that I am not trying to charge that McNamara felt that system analysis could arrive at a definite answer on a complex decision, only that he was not himself using anything more than the most rudimentary analysis in this case and

If this tentative conclusion is valid, why did he make the decision against the nuclear-powered carrier? Perhaps the answer lies more in bureaucratic rather than cost-effective reasons.

. . . . .

To begin with, from the Navy's point of view, they didn't have very good relations with the Secretariat (neither the Navy nor Defense one) before McNamara came into office. Secretary Gates was insistent on reducing the amount of Navy-Air Force bickering that became public, and the Navy still didn't feel the Air Force had enough consideration for the Nation's interests (as opposed to the Air Force bureaucratic ones)

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therefore was being misleading if he claimed that any decision was made because of the results of the application of system analysis to the carrier controversy. As to the potential pitfalls of analysis in the National Security,area, I agree with James Schlesinger, "Quantitative Analysis and National Security," World Politics (January 1963), pp. 295-315. For one of the more concise statements on the issue, I bow to Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy, (New York: Columbia, 1969), p. 291--

> Systems analysis cannot substitute for wise judgement. Nor have its sensible proponents ever claimed that it could. Systematic analysis may, on the other hand, serve to sharpen the intuitions of decision makers....It may...refocus the strategic dialogue among the services upon the real issues.

As to the manner in which McNamara was using system analysis, I lean toward the evaluation that he used it to--

> give legitimacy to their exercise of budgetary influence, since this would appear less an exercise of arbitrary whim and personal bias and more a result of a "rational," "objective" process of analysis and evaluation. Such trapping of rationality proved a tremendous bargaining advantage for McNamara, not only with the services but with Congress as well, at least in his initial years.

I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 207.

to be trusted.[65] Therefore Admiral Burke was not interested in censuring flag officers who "told it like it was," whether or not the Secretary of Defense was livid. Similarly Burke was not interested in the Air Force gaining operational control over the Navy strategic forces (especially Polaris), and did not hesitate to use his legal right to appeal to the President over the SECDEF in order to prevent the Air Force from even becoming encouraged.[66]

In the opinion of at least one Admiral, the poor relationship with Gates was the direct cause of the beginning problems with McNamara.[67]

Unfortunately, the Navy under Burke was not able to regain any personal relationship ground which they may have initially lost with the new group of civilians. While some of this might be attributed to the new SECDEF's personality, it appears that it may have been just as much

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65. Although possibly (definitely, I am sure most would say) an irrational feeling on the part of the Navy, it was still very real. For example, the CNO at the time McNamara entered office felt that--

> The Air Force was pushing air power at McNamara. They either did not have the wisdom nor the integrity, one or the other, to realize that was not the whole answer, that it was wrong. (Appendix (A), answer #3, paragraph 4).

and his vice-chief expressed the opinion that--

> They were a new service and they didn't have the responsibilities that the other two did. (Appendix (D), answer #6.)

66. Incidents related by Admiral Russell, (Appendix (D), answer #1, first two paragraphs), in setting the circumstances in which McNamara took office.

67. "Gates was pretty mad at us and he told McNamara he had to watch those Admirals and Generals or they'd run over him. For a man of

or more the fault of the senior Navy representatives.[68] Whatever the causes, it seems safe to say that the Navy had not established an especially good rapport with the civilian side of the Defense team.

Perhaps the lack of Navy rapport with McNamara's team would not have been considered important, but there is at least a primae facie case to be made that the Secretary and his staff were originally biased in favor of problem solutions which favored the "Air Force" rather than the "Navy" answer. There are three aspects to this consideration: 1) McNamara and his staff had personal ties to the Air Force and were more familiar with Air Force capabilities and arguments, therefore they were more likely to recognize the applicability of an "Air Force" approach to new problems; 2) In the controversial issues, McNamara demonstrated a tendency to select solutions which favored the Air Force; and 3) Whether or not the first two points are true, the Navy thought they were, and acted accordingly.

With respect to the personal ties of the Secretary and his staff, one must consider that McNamara had been a consultant before the war for the Air Force even before he served his World War II duty in the Army Air Corps evaluating bombing damage effectiveness, and he retained his

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McNamara's personality, that was all he needed." (Appendix (D), answer #1)

68. It appears evident from at least two of the incidents described by Burke and Russell that they had some immediate problems in determining the proper approach to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. The SECNAV incident was perhaps not as serious as presented, but might be thought more of describing the general atmosphere of misunderstanding that existed within the Navy command (Appendix (D), answer #1, paragraph 3). The incident with McNamara (Appendix (A), last paragraph), on the other hand, not only demonstrates the same point for the Navy-Defense relationships, but also seems more damaging with each rereading. Given the observed personality of one of the participants and the reported personality of the other, one can imagine the first poking to elicit a response and unexpectedly hitting a chord, but one cannot even imagine what the results of such an incident might be.

Colonel's commission in the Air Force Reserves during his tour as Secretary of Defense.[69] His principal assistants in the offices of the Comptroller and Deputy for System Analysis had been associated with the Air Force through their work at RAND, which had evolved from Douglas Aircraft, and was almost exclusively devoted to work for the Air Force at that time. The importance of this influence in these offices seems difficult to expand out of proportion since McNamara had himself risen to President of Ford through those routes. For his own Deputy, McNamara chose a man (Gilpatric) who had been Under Secretary of the Air Force in the 1950s, and McNamara chose a personal associate from his teaching days, Eugene Zuchert, as his Secretary of the Air Force. Zuchert had been Assistant Secretary of the Air Force during the Admiral's revolt of 1949.[70]

What is perhaps even more important were the group of advisors whom McNamara relied upon for advice as to National strategy. When one considers the fact that McNamara certainly had no credentials in the field, and by all reports did not generally accept advice by the military on the subject, the source of his advice becomes a very critical factor in evaluating what possible pressures (overt or covert) he might have been subjected to. In this respect, it has been reliably reported that

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69. Trewhitt, op. cit., p. 36, reports that McNamara was first turned down by the Navy because of poor vision.

70. Ibid, pp. 11-13 and 36-39 on the backgrounds of the particular men chosen (Trewhitt does not note Zuchert's previous experience). See Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) for a discussion of RAND as it developed from Douglas Aircraft Company. Robert K. Massie reported that Enthoven's job for the past four years (probably only job considering his youth) was to analyze various aspects of SAC. "Fight for Survival of the Supercarrier," Saturday Evening Post (2 November 1963), p. 18.

Detailed resumes of McNamara, Gilpatric, Bram and Hitch are contained in House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture, 1963, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1964), pp. 358-361.

McNamara relied almost exclusively upon "a relatively small group of persons formerly associated with RAND but with an exceptionally strong in-group cohesion among themselves..."[71]

With respect to the alleged demonstrated partiality toward the Air Force, two examples seem prominent. The first is the question of land-based versus sea-based tactical air, and it appears that the record is clear that McNamara favored the former. In addition, it appears not unreasonable to draw the conclusion that, at least at first, McNamara was against the carrier because he "felt" that land-based air power was less expensive and just as effective. In this context, the fact that no one felt it necessary to even conduct studies on that issue until after McNamara had departed from DoD seems significant.

The second example is the TFX, of which more will be said at a later point, but one could make the argument, that, given the commonality requirement, "since the most critical design parameters were those involved with carrier operation," the Navy, not the Air Force, should have been designated as the controlling/coordinating Service at the beginning. In that way, the Navy would not have been forced into a design that was impractical for carrier operation.[72]

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71. Bernard Brodie, "The McNamara Phenomenon," World Politics (July 1965), pp. 678-9. The remainder of the sentence is:

> and thus a sometimes marked degree of personal and intellectual separation from most other members of that organization that developed a philosophy extremely close in detail to that which Mr. McNamara has since made his own.

72. For one expression of this opinion, see Appendix (C), answer #6.

The most important of these three aspects is the third, for if the Navy felt that the Secretary and his staff were biased, it seems at least possible that "the thought might be the father of the deed," and even more probably that in acting in conjunction with this conviction, the Navy might damage either the acceptability or the credibility of their position. After this build-up, it seems anti-climatic to observe that in their interviews, each CNO who was associated with McNamara and his staff reported that he felt that the Secretary was biased toward the Air Force viewpoint.[73]

At least one comment must be made about McNamara's personality. His failure to either understand or to care about the social ammenities (e.g. answering an invitation to visit) was interpretated as a personal insult by CNOs who had managed to rise to the highest level within their profession without losing a sense of courtesy.[74] At the same time, one Admiral felt that there were problems with the McNamara character, besides a lack of social graces--

> ....in office for only three weeks when I found that McNamara was a liar. I can't say that he consciously told lies, but he is the type of person who is so sure that he is right, that he changes things around in his mind. He doesn't really know that he is lying.

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73. Burke did not, but his VCNO did express that feeling. For specific comments, see Appendix (B), answer #9; Appendix (C), answers #1 and #6; and Appendix (D), answer #3.

Another manner of approaching the carrier decision is to ask what McNamara's interests in the decision were. In other words, putting aside the question of land-based versus sea-based tactical air for a moment, is it possible that McNamara had any other interests in the issue?

I think the answer is definitely yes. I would propose that McNamara's primary interest, just as is commonly thought, was to gain control of the military. As Admiral Burke expressed it so well when quizzed as to the Secretary's orientation:

> They weren't oriented toward anything. They were interested in getting control of the military. They were young. They didn't know their ass from a tin cup about the military strategy or world problems. After a while they learned some of the arguments that were being used and they used the same arguments to try to get control.[75]

If this were the Secretary's goal, then 1 August 1961 was a temporary setback, for the new CNO was not willing to bend as far as McNamara required of his Chiefs.[76] While the final boiling point was yet some months distant, perhaps the end result could have been seen in January of 1962 when the CNO refused to obey McNamara's instructions to use the Navy to lobby in Congress against the Air Force B-70 program. McNamara would have to face that one himself.[77]

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75. Appendix (A), answer #3.

76. For one account of this requirement, see John G. Norris, "Dropping of Anderson Is Viewed as Warning," The Washington Post, (8 May 1963), p. A2. For another, more personal view, see Appendix (D), answer #3, paragraphs 2 and 6.

77. "I didn't get involved in inter-service rivalry. One of the first things Fred (Korth) brought down to me was the word that McNamara expected the Navy to carry the freight in Congress lobbying against the big aircraft, what was it, the B-70. I told Korth that I wouldn't do it, that I understood the Air Force pretty well, that I knew LeMay, and that I wasn't going to do his dirty work for him. We were going to justify our programs to Congress and let the Air Force justify theirs. McNamara

Contrary to popular conceptions (of the importance of conflict during the Cuban Crisis), it appears that Admiral Anderson's final falling out with McNamara was over the TFX, particularly Anderson's refusal to remain muzzled over an issue which he felt was a question of life and death, and over which McNamara wanted him to place the cloak of confusion.[78] It was not an honorable thing to do (and it didn't serve the Navy's purposes). Therefore Anderson did not submit a statement for clearance by McNamara before he testified before the McClellan subcommittee which was investigating the contract award for the TFX.[79] Since

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was not happy about my refusal." Appendix (B), answer #10.

One of many interesting questions this statement brings to mind is whether or not this setback caused McNamara any political problems with his allies in the DoD, if in fact many of them were oriented toward sympathy for Air Force positions in general.

78. Admiral Anderson had lost two close male relatives in Navy aircraft accidents and had a son who was a test pilot. As to his personal views on the TFX and McNamara's directives on the subject--

> McNamara made a snap judgement, he thought he'd make points with the President and the Vice President, who was Lyndon Johnson, and he made a mistake. He hadn't even read the report (evaluation). McNamara didn't come back to either the Navy or LeMay to discuss the issue. McNamara put out the word that his decision was to be justified no matter who got hurt if they got in the way. I told everyone in the Navy that it was going to be a big issue and that I wanted everyone to stick to their own area of expertise, to avoid speculation and to stick to the facts. Korth went into a rage when I refused to follow McNamara's line. (Appendix (B), answer #11)

79. Admiral Russell identified the testimony as being critical--

> (Y)ou remember how Admiral Anderson got fired. The whole problem was over some testimony before a Committee on the Hill. All the members of the Secretary's staff were sitting around with sharpened pencils waiting for a copy of his statement and he told them he didn't have one, he was just going up there to tell the truth (about the TFX). Then McNamara sent (Secretary of the Navy) Korth out to the Observatory on a Sunday morning to tell Anderson that he was fired. On a Sunday morning when Anderson

his remarks were critical, and since McNamara had already demonstrated (to the point of a constitutional conflict) that he was determined to censure all military speeches, both for tone and content, the die was cast.[80]

In recalling the issue, it seems impossible to overemphasize the importance of the Navy's TFX conflict with McNamara. To quote one CNO--

> You don't realize the bitterness that had been engendered by the TFX fight. The TFX was more than 50% of our problems with McNamara. You don't insult a man's baby daughter. The atmosphere of hatred affected everything else.[81]

> was getting ready for an afternoon party for various members of different staffs, Korth came out to tell him he was fired. Anderson immediately called Kennedy who didn't know anything about it. Anderson was really deeply hurt. He went in to see McNamara about it the next morning and McNamara came across his room with his hand out and Anderson put his hand behind him and said, "No, Mr. Secretary, you have deeply hurt me, I always have believed that a man should be able and required to tell the truth."
>
> Anyway there was quite some talk about the firing and McNamara told Kennedy that if the President appointed Anderson to anything in the Continental United States that he, McNamara, would resign. So Kennedy offered Anderson the Ambassadorship to Portugal. Anderson asked for 48 hours to think it over. Burke advised him not to take it, that it was time to make a stand, and not to take anything from them, but Adm. Claude Ricketts was the VCNO and he advised Anderson to take it because he could do the country some good as an Ambassador. Anderson took Ricketts advice and Burke was furious.

Other accounts which have identified this testimony as critical are those by Norris, op. cit.; an editorial in The Evening Star (Washington) of May 1963, p. A-13; and "McNamara-Anderson Rifts Led to Ouster," Aviation Week and Space Technology (13 May 1963), p. 26.

80. For an account of McNamara's censorship of over 1500 military speeches and the resulting Congressional investigation (which determined that President Kennedy's claim of executive privilege to not disclose who had made "silly" changes was valid) in late 1961-early 1962, see Trewhitt, op. cit., pp. 92ff.

When the Secretary of the Navy conspicuously walked out in the middle of Anderson's next public speech, the lines of battle were firmly drawn (perhaps etched is a more descriptive phrase) between the civilians in the DoD and the Navy. Anderson was ignomiously fired a few days later.[82]

There was another Navy fly in McNamara's control ointment, one whose speeches he could also not edit and whom he could not fire--Admiral Rickover. In fact, Rickover's close association with Congress and his obvious technical successes (Nautilus and Polaris) which had been ballyhooed by the previous administration for their own political purposes,

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81. Admiral McDonald, Appendix (C), answer #6. One can look at the chronology and speculate on the relationship of the TFX problem to the carrier decisions.

82. Discussion of Korth's departure from a Navy League awards luncheon during Anderson's speech on the requirement for both loyalty down and up the chain of command, see Jack Anderson, "Navy League's Backwash," The Washington Post (20 May 1963), p. B20.

For even more widely-read comments on the firing see "Guys Who Get in Their Way," Time (17 May 1963), p. 28; "He Had Better Be Right," Time (31 May 1963), p. 18 (the He in the title refers to McNamara); and "Adamant Admiral," Time (21 June 1963), p. 19.

For a statement that Admiral Anderson sent out to the Navy on 10 May to still the rising criticism (and which, in addition to his actions in taking the Ambassadorship) speaks volumes about Anderson's personal belief in "loyalty up") see Department of Defense directorate for News Services (Washington) press release No. N-46-63 of 10 May 1963--

> I note with considerable concern the speculation as to possible reasons for the decision to limit my term to two years. I would, therefore, implore you to avoid any remarks, comments, or assumptions relating thereto. Let me assure each and every man in the naval service that our Commander in Chief has made clear to me not only his confidence in our naval leadership but his pride in our service. It would, therefore, be unbecoming of the naval profession to engage in any actions or reactions which could do damage to our service reputations -- collective and individual -- as well as to the prestige of the Armed Forces of these United States and of our civilian leadership.

made Rickover practically invulnerable from reproach. The only way that the DoD could even "lay a glove on him" was by withholding Congressionally appropriated funds and/or by fighting in Congress programs that Rickover sponsored (and which would fall under his jurisdiction, thus tending, if anything, to increase his political clout).[83]

If the suggestions as to McNamara's interest in controlling the military are valid, and if he were felt that the Navy was not responding as quickly as the other services to his guidance, is it feasible that he was not uninterested in an opportunity to reemphasize "civilian control?" One wonders what the first opportunity was.[84]

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83. At least one of the major actors specifically identified this relationship--

> Admiral Rickover had a powerful position with Congress. This infuriated McNamara, but McNamara couldn't get Rickover because of his power position with Congress. Since he couldn't get Rickover, he went after us (the rest of the Navy). Appendix (B), answer #4.

I think that if McNamara was irritated by Anderson's relatively mild criticism, it is reasonable to expect that he might find Rickover's pointed remarks at least equally offensive.

84. It is also instructive to note that it was not possible to "hit at" both Rickover and the "rest of the Navy" through the submarine building program because, as will be discussed later, the rest of the Navy was not thrilled by the current program and would have welcomed any cutback, no matter who caused it. This left the nuclear-powered surface ship building program. In addition to the nuclear-powered carrier which, as we have seen, McNamara fought in Congress, one should remember that Congress authorized a nuclear-powered frigate in the summer of 1963 which McNamara thwarted by a consistent refusal to release the funds to the Navy. For McNamara's explanation to Congress of his reason for cancelling the DLGN and the HASC questioning, see the Military Posture Hearings of 1963, op. cit., pp. 530, 918-921, 924-5 and 980.

After inquiring as to whether or not the Secretary may have had interests in the carrier decision (in addition to the ones that were made part of the public record on the controversy) it seems logical to ask the same question with respect to the Navy stand on the subject. Was the Navy's obvious reluctance to make a capital issue over the carrier power plant due to the weakness of their case, their misunderstanding of the uses of systems analysis, or possibly a third (or fourth, or fifth) reason?

It doesn't take too careful a review of the events of that period to determine that the Navy had other problems than the carrier which they felt took priority over Admiral Rickover's power plant.

The first was money. Despite all of McNamara's protestations to the contrary (footnote #53), all the people who were associated with the preparation of the budget, both on the Navy and SECDEF staffs, was aware that money was a real constraint. The Navy realized that whether or not the administration philosophically believed "we can afford any defense this country needs,"[85] it was not feasible to "need" any more than was currently politically available. As Admiral Burke phrased it--

> What so many people don't realize is that the Country has a limited amount of money. The amount of money you spend is absolutely critical. McNamara was wrong on a lot of things, but not on that one. Nuclear power cost a lot of money which then wasn't available for other things....[86]

One must recall, too, that the Navy was in a particular money crunch. The Navy had developed a strategic weapon system which was invaluable (both to the Nation's deterrent force posture and to stave off Air Force claims to the whole strategic responsibility), however, the Navy had not

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85. As phrased by Mr. McNamara in JCAE, 1963 Hearings, op. cit., p. 161.

86. Appendix (A), answer #1, paragraph 2.

been given sufficient extra funds to pay for the submarines, but was simply having to pay for them from the funds that were normally used to pay for modernization of the surface force. The rise in (Congressional) popularity of the tactical submarine had only accentuated this problem. To fully appreciate the significance of this problem, review footnote #53 and Appendix (E) and note that not only had the Navy not received any greater amount of the DoD (read as Air Force) Strategic funds with which to construct the Polaris system (as the McNamara system theoretically worked), the Navy's total budget allotted to ship construction and conversion was shrunk proportionally, and only two-thirds of that decrease was due to a lesser strategic funding in McNamara's first budget year (FY1963). By comparison of the number and types of ships that were requested per year, it appears evident that submarines were being built at the expense of surface ships (funded from the "Other Warships" column).

The Navy was tied into this problem so tightly that they couldn't even complain too loudly, since Burke's first decision upon taking office in 1955 had been to go for the Polaris program,[87] and his Vice Chief, Russell, was known as the primary motivational force behind the system,[88] it was bureaucratically difficult for the Navy to draw attention to their dilemma. It is perhaps significant that when both had been relieved,

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87. For the official description history of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, see Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). The description of Admiral Burke's critical hand in the decision process is contained on p. 21.

88. See Appendix (D), answer #7. For more detailed descriptions see Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation, (Denver: University of Denver, 1967). pp. 37ff; or Sapolsky, op. cit., pp. 19ff.

the next CNO moved quickly to cut the programmed number of Polaris submarines and free some funds for the rest of the Navy.[89]

While the money problem for the Navy was primarily due to the strategic and submarine building program in the early sixties, it should be noted that this problem did not go away when the Polaris building program was paid for, for by that time the armed forces were under the money crunch of the President's Vietnam war policy. When questioned about whether the lack of surface ships in new construction was related to the nuclear carrier, the CNO in the latter half of the McNamara tenure answered--

> No. The whole thing was a matter of money.... McNamara was trying to hold the budget down. Johnson didn't want the public to know how much it was costing....McNamara was telling him what Johnson wanted to hear when Bob told him it could be done out of stockpiles and then rebuilt over a long period. The President was interested in domestic politics....he had always said that when he got to a position of responsibility, he was going to do something for the poor people, and when he got there he

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89. Admiral Anderson was very concerned about the amount of the Navy budget strategic forces were controlling--

> Polaris was the most forward looking portion of the strategic forces, because of the invulnerability of the forces. But it was expensive. We had an understanding (with the Secretary of Defense) that the cost of Polaris would not come out of the tactical Navy's budget. McNamara's talk about money not being a restriction was a lot of hogwash. Money was always a restriction. Polaris and Poseiden both came out of the tactical forces' budget....We had cut the program of 45 Polaris submarines to 41 in order to equalize the distribution of funds throughout the Navy (primarily to free funds to fix up the surface ship missile program).

was saddled with that war that he couldn't get out of.[90]

So, to provide the Navy with one approach-avoidance conflict, there was the problem of money. The Navy's problem throughout the sixties was a need for money now. Not a need for money in the event of a declared war, and not money which would be saved over the next ten or thirty years by a more cost-effective carrier. The Navy needed the extra money which they were required to spend at the beginning of the construction period of a nuclear carrier (and which they would only have to spend over the next thirty years to support a conventional one).[91] Is this reason enough to explain Roherty's observed "noticeable ambivalence in the Navy attitude."

Possibly there was another factor. Which was the more important issue for the Navy to win, the TFX or the carrier power plant? To answer that from the Navy's point of view, one only needs to examine Arleigh Burke's discussion of sea-based air power--

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90. Admiral McDonald, Appendix (C), answer #4. By reading the remainder of the McDonald interview, one receives the impression that he was particularly sympathetic to President Johnson's domestic political problems and considerations. If that perception is true, might it reasonably be extrapolated that during this period the Navy would be more reluctant than usual to adopt any policy that might cause the President political problems (such as asking for more money for a nuclear-powered carrier)?

91. One should not forget that a "cost-effective" solution to a problem can easily cost a great deal more initially than a solution which would be much poorer in the short run. It seems to be human and/or bureaucratic nature to honestly believe that money will be easier next year (or the year after). The interaction of these two factors generally seems to push decision-makers in the direction of the solution which requires smaller this-year costs, a position held by the conventional carrier

there were a great number of "favors" which were in the perogative of the Secretary of Defense to make, which were difficult to contest, and which the Navy considered important.[95] When all of these conflicting desires were placed in the balance, it appears that the Navy decided to seek a truce, and the nuclear power plant was offered as a token of their sincerity--

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> The problem with analysis at this time was that he had the power of the computer behind him. He could do a great number of analysis very fast, each time varying the inputs. He could provide rapid comparisons. The problem of course was that each time he got garbage out because he put garbage in. The reason it was garbage is because what is needed for defense of the country is only an estimate. It is only a feel that you acquire. You can't analyze or quantify it, it's a feel.

Appendix (A), answer #3, paragraph 2.

95. For an excellent example, and one that may have some application to the controversy of interest, Admiral McDonald described an incident that probably occurred in the Spring of 1964--

> Let me give you an example of the need for rapport with the Secretary of Defense. When it was time to name a new CINCPAC, I was completely outvoted in the JCS. Even the Commandant of the Marine Corps voted against me....(I)t was important that the Navy get that job. I didn't think the war was going to last forever, and when it was over the other services weren't going to be interested in that area. So I went to McNamara and told him I wanted Sharp in that job but the rest of the Chiefs were voting for the Air Force man. McNamara told me he'd take care of it and he did so, despite the combined votes of the Chiefs. The only problem was that then I owed the son of a bitch a favor.

Appendix (C), answer #3, last paragraph.

The Navy's success in this instance, in which the Navy initiated the "scratch my back, I'll..." sequence must be contrasted with the events of October 1963 in which the Navy had lost joint military responsibility (control) of the Middle East/Indian Ocean area to the Air Force. For accounts of the latter see the "Whiz Kid" U.S. News report, op. cit., or, for a more analytical account, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Korth Resignation," The New York Times, 15 October 1963, p. 33.

> I looked at my job as one of pouring oil on troubled waters. The Navy and the Secretary of Defense had gotten so far apart the Navy was not going to get anything. All communications had broken down. I know many people felt that I was kow-towing and they were right, I would have kissed McNamara's___ _ at high noon if I thought it would help to smooth things over and there were many times I felt I had....The fellow who said he would rather be right than President was never President....I felt we needed a deck ....I remember talking in his office with Pastori and he said, Admiral, you are settling for a slice and we are trying to give you a whole loaf. I said, Yes, but we're awfully hungry....I believed that the time had come for nuclear power but I also believed that we wouldn't get a nuclear CVA-67 without at least a delay of one year. Actually we never would have gotten the carrier. If we had made an issue and fought McNamara, he would have delayed the carrier, and we would have had to fight the battle again the next year and the next year and the next. Time was important. We needed the carrier. In the end, McNamara went along with me. There was no change in analysis, McNamara just became convinced that the Navy was not his enemy. In addition, it was possible at the time to advocate the conventional power plant without arguing against nuclear power.
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> There were a hell of a lot of things on my mind that were more important than the nuclear carrier.[96]

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While the foregoing may or may not be an explanation for the Navy's ambiguity on the issue, what possible reasons could be offered for the Secretary's change in position on the carrier's power plant issue?

The first one is the one Admiral McDonald noted in the last paragraph. McNamara no longer felt that the Navy was threatening him personally on the issue of civilian control. In addition, the Navy had paid the proper acknowledgement to the science of System Analysis by finally establishing their own system analysis center and putting in charge an

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96 Appendix (c), answer #2, paragraph 2

Officer who had worked on both McNamara's own staff and the Secretary of the Navy's and was trusted by both.[97]

Another possible reason is that the carrier issue had become a political liability for the Democratic party during the off year elections of 1964, and President Johnson's moves to defuse this potential issue had virtually locked McNamara into approving the nuclear power plant. As an indication of the Republican attempt early in the election year to make the carrier issue a political one there is the Republican move in the house to introduce mandatory legislation to embarrass the Administration on the issue.[98] In addition, Johnson's moves to counter the Goldwater charges "of military lethargy" resulted in McNamara announcing a new R&D project to improve the carrier reactor design, and the President confirming and embroidering on that theme as the campaigning heated up.[99]

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97. Apparently the Navy was somewhat reluctant to acknowledge that they needed any additional capability in this area, and, after delaying as long as possible in even agreeing to work with OSD/SA, the first Navy Pentagon System Analysis group was finally established by SECNAV in his organization more than two and one-half years after McNamara took office. After another year, that group still had only nine officers, of which only four had (any) post-graduate training. The Office of Naval Operations had not yet established its own specific group in the OSD/SA image. (RADM Draper L. Kauffman in the "Comment and Discussion" section of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1964, pp. 121-3).

The Officer who was assigned to head the OPNAV office when it was established was RADM Zumwalt.

98. John W. Finney, "G.O.P. Bills Back Atomic Carrier," The New York Times, 6 February 1964, p. 7.

99. Max Frankel, "President Hails Missile Progress," The New York Times, 6 September 1964, p. 27. The President invoked the image of Admiral Rickover (perhaps making Rickover more bureaucratically more difficult for the SECDEF to attack) and promised a nuclear carrier in the "1968-69" time frame, dependent upon the development pace of the two reactor power plant.

For a view on how the decision was arrived at, on the LBJ ranch, sans analysts, see Appendix (C), answer #4, last paragraph.

A third possible explanation might be that McNamara had so many potential conflicts with Congress during the last quarter of his tenure, all of which were more important to him than the carrier, that there was ample incentive to reduce the number of balls which he was trying to maintain in the air at any one time. If one were to try to determine if a list of important items could be constructed, perhaps the following would be included:

Vietnam--the administration had decided to go into Vietnam in earnest and Congressional support was essential. Large scale bombing of the North had started in February and in defense of the administration's actions and policy, McNamara found it necessary to downplay the importance of carrier vulnerability that he had found so critical two years earlier--

> I do not think there is any real danger to our carriers from the North Vietnamese. I do not think they have in the (sic) their power to seriously damage and certainly not to sink one of the carriers because of the way they are constructed.[100]

Impoundment of funds--Congress had not gotten used to the loss of power over the Services programs (to Secretary McNamara), and they certainly were not happy with the Administration's continued flouting of the Congressional will through the impounding of funds appropriated for specific weapon's systems. Congress felt that this policy had reached new heights of imprudence under the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. President Kennedy had talked the Congress out of a direct confrontation on this issue once before in (the Rose Garden walk), but Congressional resentment was building up again, and Admiral Rickover was in there

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100. Senate Appropriations Committee 1966 Hearings on Military Appropriations, (S-2-8), 89th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: GPO, 1966), p. 342.

chipping away at the blocks, constantly, but respectfully reminding Congress that McNamara was openly flouting the will of Congress, and was proud of it.[101]

The B-70--McNamara still was not about to approve this expensive program which had considerable congressional backing. It was this controversy that had been the issue of Kennedy's Rose Garden walk with Vinson three years earlier. In 1964, McNamara had finally come out publically against the project. Hearings this year would be predictably brutal.[102]

The C5A--McNamara had overruled the service source selection board (shades of the TFX) and awarded the contract to Lockheed-Georgia rather than Boeing (Seattle). McNamara's staff felt the C5A was going to be the best "exhibit" to date of the effectiveness and validity of the

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101. For an example of Rickover's patient, careful attack, see the exchange on pp. 12 and 13 of "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program," JCAE, 1966 Hearings, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, GPO, 1966).

102. For one discussion on the B-70 controversy, see Trewhitt, op. cit., pp. 120ff. For what proports to be the system analysis one, see Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., pp. 243-251. Note that if Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968) is correct when he reports that the TFX decision was not the result of elaborate system analysis, because the system analysis office had--

> neither the services nor his staff as yet (in 1962) had the resources to produce what he would have considered valid estimates of aircraft development and production costs

and therefore McNamara had to rely on "rough judgements' unsupported by detailed analysis" (both quotes from p. 165), then perhaps the B-70 was also not the result of "system analysis," but only a "rough judgement," for Admiral Anderson has reported that McNamara had made his decision on the B-70 as early as December 1961 (before the TFX decisions Art discusses). See footnote #77).

cost-effectiveness technique, but some people expected Senator Jackson to question some of the decisions that had been made.[103]

The ABM--McNamara was against deployment of the system and had marshalled up technological reasons until 1964 to argue against the deployment. After then he had begun using cost-effectiveness ones. There appeared to be a great deal of sentiment in Congress for deployment.[104]

Relations with Congress--McNamara's relationship with Congress had been steadily deteriorating since President Kennedy's death, if not before. If nothing else, one would expect the normal amount of resentment that grows over the space of two Presidential terms, but there is some indication that McNamara's confident presentations, which had initially been received so well by the Congress, were being accepted reluctantly, if not with some misgivings as to either/or their accuracy and validity. The succession of Representative Rivers to the chairmanship of the House Armed Service Committee, and his public pledges to bring McNamara under control, at whatever expense was necessary, could have provided McNamara or President Johnson with a reason to seek retrench some of the Executive/Legislative relationship.[105]

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103. For a polemic, superficial and misleading (but the most referenced) account, see Berkeley Rice, The C5A Scandal, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971). For an account which is not as complete, but is more convincing in describing McNamara's bureaucratic ties to the program, see A. Ernest Fitzgerald, The High Priests of Waste, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), especially his preliminary comments on pp. 3-58.

104. Halperin, "Decision to Deploy the ABM," op. cit. For another account, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 74-88.

106. First, it is of interest to note that President Johnson had been a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy before he had accepted the Vice Presidential nomination and the Committee Chairman was not above using those ties. As early as December 1963, he had begun to remind the President of those ties and of the Committee's conviction on the carrier issue (1967-68 Hearings, op. cit., p. 262).

Secondly, the reviewing of any of McNamara's testimony in the Congress dating approximately from the death of President Kennedy, indicates that at least some members of the Congress were becoming somewhat irritated with the attitude of superiority of "rightiousness" which they felt the Secretary had adopted in his relationship with the Congress. For what became a more typical exchange with the further passage of time, see House Armed Services Committee, 1964 Hearings on Military Posture (No. 36), 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1964), pp. 7107ff. on the question of McNamara's claimed "savings." For a quick overlook, see "Rough Days Ahead for Secretary McNamara?" U.S. News & World Report, 8 November 1965, p. 24.

Thirdly, there appears to be little question that Mendel Rivers was determined to obtain McNamara's attention to what Congress was trying to tell him about the Constitutional perogatives of the respective branches of Government. There is an early article "New House Foe Fires on McNamara," in Business Week, 3 July 1965, pp. 24-5 which describes this political fight, and it appears that by the end of the year Rivers had decided that the only way to get the Executive's attention was by the same method the proverbial farmer uses with his oxen. In early November of the same year, Rivers had threatened to take some action unless the nuclear power controversy was settled--

> I urge that you give consideration to establishing a policy of utilizing nuclear propulsion in all future major surface warships for the U.S. Navy. In the view of our committee, the Department of Defense has been extremely dilatory in establishing such a policy. I fear that this much-needed policy will not be established without your direct intervention, or that of the Congress. (reprinted in JCAE, 1967-68 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 281ff.)

By December, Rivers had publically announced that there would be NO FY67 budget unless McNamara mended his ways. He had also announced how he would prevent the passage of this budget. (George C. Wilson, "Rivers Renews Drive to Curb McNamara," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 January 1966, p. 38.

For an excellent discussion/comparison of Rivers handling of the HASC see John T. Whelan, "Some Conditions Affecting Continuity and Change in Congressional Committee Involvement in Defense Policy: The Case of the House Committee of Armed Services," (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of Pittsburg, 1972).

Finally, it has been often reported that President Johnson was much more sensitive than his predecessor to Congressional opinion, particular specific Congressmen whom he respected. Halperin, op. cit., p. 76, writes that--

> For Johnson, certain of his former colleagues on the Senate constituted a major reference group on national

Before summarizing my conclusions on the issue, I think it is significant to note the manner in which the different CNOs represented different and/or consistent viewpoints with respect to the carrier power plant and Mr. McNamara and the effect this had on the CVA-67 controversy.

Admiral Burke (pre-1961)--appears to have been more interested in the problems of maintaining the maximum possible surface ship and tactical air capability as was feasible in the money crunch caused by the demands of the building strategic and tactical nuclear submarine programs. He did not feel that additional funds were politically available for the nuclear power plant for a carrier, and he did not have sufficient funds available to volunteer to absorb the additional costs.

Admiral Anderson (1961-63)--was concerned with the immediate monetary demands of the nuclear power plant, but he was even more concerned with the conceptual changes in the relationship between the DoD managerial team and the Services. It appears that his reluctance to compromise his personal and professional principles prevented him from successfully adapting to the changing political environment and produced a situation in which the Navy directly challenged the Secretary of Defense, in a manner, and with results, similar to those of 1949.

Admiral McDonald (1963-67)--was concerned more with the political cost of the nuclear power plant. He recognized the futility of any direct or indirect Navy effort which appeared to be an attack on the Secretary or his office. Since the nuclear carrier had become such an

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> security matters. He had had a close relation with Richard Russell, who was Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee...

and was from the same small town in Georgia as the Chief of Naval Operations, who, despite his denials, appears to have been (to be?) a consumate politician. (see Appendix (C), answer #3, paragraph 6, and answer #5).

leave he willingly avoided any short-term efforts in this controversy in order to achieve gains in the larger arena of Navy-SECDEF relations. This policy proved to be effective, not only in the "big picture," but also in achieving specific SECDEF support for the carrier nuclear power plant. In this latter success he was assisted by several other bureaucratic considerations which made it "cost-effective" for Mr. McNamara to change his mind on the issue.

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My primary conclusion is that the nuclear carrier controversy was a pawn which was moved on the board of events by two major power controversies, one of which was the issue of increased executive branch civilian control of the military by means of the centralized "McNamara" system, and the second issue was the Constitutional relationship between the Legislative and Executive branches.

It is my derivative opinion that one of Roherty's conclusions (and my initial frame of reference) with respect to the controversy--that the Navy suffered at the hands of the McNamara team primarily because of "the Navy's indecision about how to react to the criteria and techniques imposed by the new management...followed by clumsiness"--is not supported by a bureaucratic review of the record, as supplemented by interviews with some of the major Navy actors.

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Interview with Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (ret), (Chief of Naval Operations from 1955-1961) conducted on 3 May 1974 from 1050 to 1150 in room 310 at 1015 18th Street, N.W. Sketchy notes were taken. This paraphrasion was reconstructed from memory beginning at 1630 on 3 May 1974.

Q. 1. An author named Rourke has written of the nuclear power for the CVA-67 conflict and has noted that the problem was that "the Navy did not enter into the fray with its customary assuredness." Is that what you perceived as happening?

A. 1. No. What do you need a carrier for--to provide mobile air power for concentration at a specific point. What do you need to obtain that? You need the aircraft. You need living quarters for the men, you need defensive units to protect you against submarines and you need some kind of propulsion plant. You don't need nuclear power. You do need all of the rest. Nuclear power is nice but it costs money. When the question of nuclear power came up again, following the Enterprise, I went over to Congress and interviewed a great number of Congressmen. I couldn't get sufficient support for the nuclear carrier to enable it to pass, but I thought I could get sufficient support for a conventional one. So I took what I could get and I think that it was the proper thing to do.

What so many people don't realize is that the Country has a limited amount of money. The amount of money you spend is absolutely critical. McNamara was wrong on a lot of things, but not on that one. Nuclear power cost a lot of money which then wasn't available for other things. There are even occasions in which you do not need carriers. There are occasions in which a conventional submarine will do as good a job as a nuclear one. They are quieter, for instance. But if you have to have just one kind, nuclear submarines are better. The best thing to have is a mix, but Congress would not let me buy any conventional submarines. I would have, but they wouldn't have let me.

The basic problem that a CNO has is how to get the maximum combat capability. Some capabilities are necessary, some are good and some are just nice to have. The question the CNO is always asking himself is "Can I take less and will it serve to accomplish the tasks?"

The advances since then in nuclear power have, of course, changed the situation. I, of course, am talking about the increase in core life. At the time, you must remember that in full combat the ammunition runs out about the same time as the fuel. Not all the time, but sometimes. Since you have to resupply with Ammo, you might as well resupply with fuel.

Q. 2. How did you react to Representative Cannon's anti-Carrier speech in Congress? Was that sentiment wide spread?

A. 2. There was some anti-carrier sentiment. It was our own fault. We oversold carriers like the Air Force oversold bombers. Carriers can't do everything and they don't last forever. We had zealots that maintained they could and all this did was irritate the Air Force advocates and others who knew that the carrier wasn't the complete answer everytime.

Q. 3. How did you feel McNamara and his immediate staff were oriented on the question of land-based versus sea-based tactical air power when they came into office?

A. 3. They weren't oriented toward anything. They were interested in getting control of the military. They were young. They didn't know their ass from a tin cup about the military, strategy or world problems. After a while they learned some of the arguments that were being used and they used the same arguments to try to get control. They wanted simple, single answers. They wanted an answer that couldn't be disproved, so they emphasized the need for a nuclear capability. That that would solve everything and was the answer. System analysis was the tool they used to get control. There was such a thing as cost effectiveness long before McNamara. There always had been analysis, and particularly so before the McNamara era.

The problem with analysis at this time was that he had the power of the computer behind him. He could do a great number of analyses very fast, each time varying the imputs. He could provide rapid comparisons. The problem, of course, was that each time he got garbage out because he put garbage in. The reason it was garbage is because what is needed for defense of the country is only an estimate. It is only a feel that you acquire. You can't analyze or quantify it, it's a feel.

When McNamara came in with his computers, I took a course at IBM so that I could talk with him. I thus was prepared to discuss what was going on. The problem is that the use of analysis is often done cynically. It is done in order to prove something which you have already decided on. It doesn't take anyone too smart to determine that that's not the right way to do something. Look at the DLGN which has twin anti-air missile launchers and no surface to surface missile capability. A high-school boy should be able to see that that's stupid. Look at the ships where we are having mutinies. It doesn't take anyone too smart to say look at the other ships. If they are in the same shape, they certainly aren't in any shape to fight. It doesn't take analysis to tell you that.

The Air Force was pushing air power at McNamara. They either did not have the wisdom nor the integrity, one or the other, to realize that that was not the whole answer, that it was wrong. They built up a stock of civilian experts. That was what Rand was, and then several years later we decided to match them and that was a mistake. Now we don't have a code of ethics. We are no longer professional. We are at the mercy of people who do not have responsibility. We are dependent upon tons of paper and analysis, which we can't do, and which produces answers which our decision-makers don't understand, and which the people who make the decisions do not have the experience in order to make accurate decisions. If the Navy is worth a damn, we should be able to determine our own requirements. We have lost BUSHIPS, we have lost our intelligence, etc. An example is the surface to surface missile. It was evident 10 or 15 years ago to a high school boy that we needed surface to surface missiles. I started the development of the missile that we're working on today (HARPOON) and it's still 4 to 5 years from deployment. Something is wrong with our system. The Soviets have deployed a dozen different kinds. We should have, too. Hell, our first one should be obsolete by now. Instead we don't even have one, and I find out that it is so complicated that it's programmed to operate differently dependent upon which ocean it's in. What happens if the ship changes oceans?

The major problem with the system is that we over-study and over-analyze. I'm against making studies that you don't intend to accept. I assigned some studies out when I already knew the answers sometimes, in order to get some civilians to understand the Navy problems, but I never encouraged dishonest reports, reports which I intended to discard if they didn't come up with the answers I wanted. You can't have yes-men. You probably won't get in trouble in the first generation, but in the second generation of yes-men, you have a group that can't make decisions. You can't fire people who don't come up with the answers you want. You have to be able to fight honestly. You can't cheat at analysis, even when you know the other side is cheating, and retain your integrity. You may be able to, but others will be misled. I am often amazed at the integrity of civilians. We would like to have Bill Martin on this board I am on. After he retired from the FED, he said he would have to wait a year and then after a year he said that he would have to wait a while longer because he had a conflict of interest. And no one suggested that he come anyway because everyone knew that, even if he didn't have a conflict, if he thought he did, he did.

I selected my VCNOs because they were tough. I had a fight with Russell every morning of the week. I got a lot of unpleasant advice from them, times when he felt I was wrong. I overrode him lots of times, and also there were lots of times when I didn't do things because he opposed them. I knew we were both dedicated to the same ideal, the security of the Country, so I knew there was good reason behind his opposition. You need opposition within an organization. The most damaging thing a subordinate can do is not to tell his boss when he is wrong. The reason for a Vice Chief is because he is loyal to a cause but not the methods.

The hardest thing I have to do is tell my wife when she's wrong. She has ruined many a car engine because she doesn't know how to start it. She always floods it. I should have told her long ago but it wasn't worth it to me. Now I can't because she doesn't believe me, but she's still ruining car engines.

The problem today is that we don't know the difference between right and wrong with respect to the way of doing things.

You know McNamara was a quick learner. You had to react immediately. If you didn't nip him in the bud, he was long gone down whatever lost trail he was chasing. I got to my office about seven. McNamara learned that I did and he began doing so. I used to go down to see him two or three times a week in order to touch base. I really thought he was quite a fellow at first. Sometimes he would come up to my office and we'd talk. One day I asked him if I could see an analysis which I was sure he had. He said, "sure, you can see any analysis I have." I said, "Could I see the analysis that you did on your wife before you married her?" Well, he was furious and turned away and walked off without saying a word. I found out later that I had really hit a sore point. When he first went to Michigan, he had been going with a girl but she got polio and he dumped her because he didn't think she could help him. He really has a swell wife now. I really hit a sore point.

Reconstruction completed at 1820,
3 May 1974.

D. R. Oliver, Jr.

22 April 1974

Interview with Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. USN (ret.), Chief of Naval Operations from 1961-1963, currently Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. Interview conducted in Room 300 of the Executive Office Building, on 22 April 1974, from 1045 to 1135. This paraphrasion was reconstructed from my recollection and notes of the interview, was produced commencing about 1230 of the same day.

Q. #1. What happened with respect to the nuclear power for the CVA-67 controversy?

A. #1. The cost for the 8-reactor carrier (like the Enterprise) was excessive--about one-half a billion and rising. We could get a non-nuclear carrier for $310M (and rising). The lead time on the nuclear carrier was long (excessive). In order to get the CV, I had to accept a conventionally powered carrier. I sent word to Rickover that I couldn't justify an eight reactor carrier, and that he should get busy and design a modern plant which would cost less and would be less complicated.

One year later Rickover came up with a four reactor carrier. I proposed that we now substitute the 4 reactor carrier for the conventionally powered one. McNamara thought I had been conniving behind his back all along (to get the nuclear power plant) so he stuck with his original decision. I had originally agreed to take the conventional power plant and I stuck with my agreement.

As to which is cheaper...the long core life and the rising cost of oil, plus the extra storage space for aviation gas, means that over the life of the carrier nuclear power comes very close to being just as cost effective as conventional power. In addition to that, the flexibility of being able to operate without the need for a chain of oilers is extremely valuable. We should build only nuclear powered carriers. The major escorts also should be nuclear powered. Rickover should concentrate on smaller cores (for surface ships) with bigger outputs. The carrier is free from political constraints.

Q. #2. Was your outlook on the Carrier influenced by Representative Cannon's avowed opposition to the Carrier as evidenced by his speeches in the house in 1959?

A. #2. No. I don't recall Cannon's speech.

Q. #3. What was the relationship of the Navy with Congress?

A. #3. Admiral Rickover had a powerful position with Congress. This infuriated McNamara, but McNamara couldn't get Rickover because of his power position with Congress. Since he couldn't get Rickover, he went after us.

Q. #4. Did you feel Adm. Rickover was cooperating with you and rest of the Navy?.

A. #4. He didn't bother me (with any actions he might have taken with the Congress which were not in consonance with other Navy actions).

Q. #5. Despite McNamara's announced "Revolution," if one looks at the procurement figures for the last years of Eisenhower's reign and the first ones of Kennedy's, the Navy's total percentage of procurement remains about the same, and with the building of the increased numbers of Polaris and attack nuclear submarines, it looks as if they were being paid for by the national strategic weapon program. Did you think this was true?

A. #5. Polaris was the most forward looking portion of the strategic forces, because of the invulnerability of the forces. But it was expensive. We had an understanding that the cost of Polaris would not come out of the tactical Navy's budget. McNamara's talk about money not being a restriction was a lot of hogwash. Money was always a restriction. Polaris and Poseiden both came out of the tactical forces' budget. The problem now is to ensure that Trident doesn't set the tactical forces back again.

Q. #6. Did the rapid build-up of the strategic and tactical nuclear submarine force in the sixties result in there not being sufficient funds to build any surface ships for the first five years of McNamara's reign?

A. #6. I think it was the 1964 budget. We had asked for more nuclear (attack) submarines and the SECDEF had reduced our request. We had reclaimed the cut and McNamara had told us no. We had a meeting down at Palm Beach with the President (the JCS, SECDEF and the President). The President asked me if I had received enough and I told him no, that there were five items I needed, some more submarines, some money for maintenance, and certain aircraft procurement, plus some other things. I told him I was responsible for the long-term operation of the Navy, for the operation today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. I told him we never get enough money, but that in those cases we would like professional experienced naval officers to make the judgement on where to cut. McNamara was irritated because he had told the President that we had enough money. Kennedy just smiled. He was backing up his Secretary, and that was right.

When I got before Congress that year, Jerry Ford asked me if I had what I needed and I told him no and told him what I needed. He asked me if I had gone to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. I told him I had and he said well you've done all you could. I reminded him of that just the other day.

Q. #7. When you came into office, what was your order of priorities as to what had to be done? Were you more concerned about the procurement problems of the TFX V/STOL, Surface to Surface missiles, Submarines, the CVA or the CVAN?

A. #7. I came from my job as COMSIXTHFLEET to relieve Arleigh Burke. I was convinced the first year that my most important job was to make everything work. We were getting extremely poor performance from our guided missiles. I think Burke was right to get them out aboard ship (before they were completely reliable). The program to fix them up was expensive (through the 3T "get-well" program). The second year I emphasized the importance of people. I feel this is the most important aspect of the Navy.

We had cut the program of 45 Polaris submarines to 41 in order to equalize the distribution of funds throughout the Navy. We couldn't afford a nuclear carrier at that point.

When I became CNO, I had been prepared better than anyone else who had held the job within recent years. I had been a Fleet Commander, had served in both oceans, on the JCS and in OPNAV. I had a very experienced group of deputies. My people at OP-01, 02, 04, 05 and 06 had all had Fleets. I had Admiral Radorn (of Polaris fame) as my OP-07, which was R&D. I had a wealth of experience. I relied on these people and I kept in constant contact with the Fleet Commanders. I didn't rely on a small personal staff as Zumwalt did.

I had good relations with the Secretaries of the Navy. Excellent relations with Connolly and with Korth until the TFX controversy, and he was all involved in that one himself.

I had problems with McNamara's staff. As an example, Enthoven had a guy working for him who had been in the German Air Force during the war. His name was Dieter Schwabbs and he couldn't even get a normal security clearance. He spent so much time sending down questions to answer that we couldn't get any other work done. McNamara was doing so much that he was encroaching on the legal perogatives of the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO.

Q. #8. Was the SECDEF using bureaucratic devices to split up the Navy?

A. #8. The Navy was organized as a bilinial organization. This had worked well during World War II. I was not responsible for procurement. The Chief of Naval Material reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy and they were responsible for procurement problems. I set the requirements. The Army had been monolithic and they had had a great deal more problems during the war than had we with procurement. The Air Force had taken the monolithic structure with them when they split off from the Army. McNamara forced the Navy to reorganize on a monolithic basis. This was a mistake. The Army and Air Force should have adopted the bilinial system.

I am in favor of giving the military more of a voice in the operations and plans side of the military. The CJCS should be the equivalent of a deputy SECDEF for Operations. SECNAV should have to cut the mustard as a manager of the procurement problems.

Q. #9. Did you feel that the SECDEF and his immediate staff were biased because of their background?

A. #9. McNamara is a brilliant individual. He had a mind which was statistical. He had two faults, he considered himself infallible and his judgement was bad.

The Navy's professional talent is based on three factors. The first is the experienced flag officer, the second is the experienced Chief Petty Officers, and the third is the young naval officers whom we spend a great deal training, educating, dedicating to duty, and teaching them the "can do" spirit. There is always a shortage of ships, aircraft, maintenance money, etc., but these three factors can offset them. This is the way we manage to struggle through. This is the most important factor to maintain in the Navy. This spirit of importance and dedication is what McNamara did the most to destroy in the Navy. I will never forgive Chaffe and Nitze for bringing in Zumwalt who got rid of so many experienced officers who could have been of assistance.

The SECDEF and his assistants didn't know anything about the Navy. The only thing they knew anything about was the Air Force.

Q. #10. Did you feel that the old questions about carriers which had been raised in 1949 in the revolt of the admirals were still around to haunt you? Did you feel that the Air Force was trying to snipe at you?

A. #10. I didn't get involved in inter-service rivalry. One of the first things Fred (Korth) brought down to me was the word that McNamara expected the Navy to carry the freight in Congress lobbying against the big aircraft, what was it, the B-70. I told Korth that I wouldn't do it, that I understood the Air Force pretty well, that I knew LeMay, and that I wasn't going to do his dirty work for him. We were going to just justify ours. McNamara was not happy about my refusal.

Q. #11. Did you feel the Navy had so many other problems like the TFX that spending blue chips on the nuclear carrier was not worth it?

A. #11. Well, the TFX was another story in itself. McNamara made a snap judgement, he thought he'd make points with the President and the Vice President, who was Lyndon Johnson (from Texas), and he made a mistake. He hadn't even read the report (evaluation). McNamara didn't come back to either the Navy or LeMay to discuss the issue. McNamara put out the word that his decision was to be justified no matter who got hurt if they got in the way. I told everyone in the Navy that this was going to be a big issue and that I wanted everyone to stick to their own area of expertise, to avoid speculation and to stick to the facts. Korth went into a rage when I refused to follow McNamara's line.

Q. #12. Did you feel McNamara was a good "political animal."

A. #12. No. He told Congress he was going to do one thing at the very time he was doing something exactly opposite.

Q. #13. Well, he was successful for several years, wasn't he?

A. #13. Yes.

Q. #14. Did you feel the Navy organized to meet the "system analysis challenge" from the SECDEF? Did you feel that either of the other services did better? Was that important?

A. #14. The Navy had been doing system analysis for years. We had used the "Estimate of the Situation" as a basis for reaching a decision. We had the OEG as our evaluation group and they were very efficient. McNamara may have called it cost-effectiveness but it really was just the application of operation analysis, and we had operation analysis representatives/teams with all our fleets. We were using cost as an analysis factor. During the war the British did not deploy an airplane, they accepted a slip in operational availability because analysis showed that an alternate airplane would be more effective for the pound (cost). Operation analysis was not new with McNamara. Cost-effectiveness was just a term. His group of analysts had a tremendous cohesiveness when they arrived due to their common experience in service at RAND.

The Air Force had supported more of the new "Harvard" people who are being appointed to positions of responsibility, and they had supported more of the East-European intellectuals who came to prominence after the 1960s. Most of the latter had very shallow roots in America.

Q. #15. Do you feel that the Navy should rely more on contracts with these people rather than on in-house expertise?

A. #15. No. We have always had a great number of civilians in business who have Navy experience, such as President Nixon, Vice President Ford, Doug Dillon, etc. We and the Air Force need to have the expertise in-house. We should remain true to our principles.

Q. #16. What were your conclusions about the McNamara era?

A. #16. McNamara was the worst thing that could have happened to the country. Zumwalt has increased the deterioration of the Navy. We have too much early selection. It takes a great deal of experience to prepare individuals for the responsibility rank brings, particularly Captains. One of the worst things I ever had to do was relieve the skipper of the Coral Sea. He was making too many errors, the next one would have been bad for the Navy. I called him directly from the CNO's office and he said he had been sitting there waiting for my call. He had been early selected twice and was an excellent officer, and would have been a terrific one if he had been permitted the time to mature and gain experience.

Bud (Zumwalt) would have been a good CNO if he had had more sea experience. He came in here and wanted to take care of all the poor sailors, the blacks, and he succeeded in undermining the CPOs, one of those three essential factors in the Navy's success. Then he discarded the Flag Officers. I never wrote a letter to a Flag Officer telling him I had no job which he could usefully fill (which Zumwalt did).

We gave Tom Moorer even more experience than I had, he was CINCPAC and then CINCLANT before he was CNO. I just got through with a study and do you realize that in Europe all of those flags have practically no sea command experience at all?

Completed paraphrasing remarks
at 1510 on 22 April 1974.

D. R. Oliver, Jr.

Interview with Admiral David McDonald, USN (ret), (Chief of Naval Operations from 1963 to 1967) conducted on 2 May 1974 from 1050 to 1220 in an office of the Chief of Naval Material (Crystal Plaza #5). This paraphrasion was reconstructed from memory and sketchy notes taken at the time, and was begun at 1400 on 2 May 1974.

Q. 1. Do you think the Navy has suffered vis a vis the other services by not having enough officers schooled in liberal academic subjects so that we are not as impressive in the political atmosphere of Washington?

A. 1. There is no question about it. Of course, you must remember how this started. In peacetime, we still had our ships and still steamed, so we could conduct all the training that was used in wartime, with the exception of firing the shells, on board the ships at sea. When the first World War was over the Army couldn't do this. They weren't even mechanized. The only thing they had for the men to do was throw manure and cut grass. So they established a bunch of schools to occupy their time. The Air Corps was brought up in this atmosphere, and even though they had the planes to look after, they were used to going to schools. If we send people to schools, we don't have the people to man the ships at sea. However, I bet we have more than four times the percentage of officers in school now than we did in 1922. I never did go to any school except to the National War College. I said why should I go to a school to learn tactics when I'm doing it out here in the ocean? But there was no question that we were getting licked in the political arena, in the JCS and the Secretary's office. We were not used to fighting the other services, we'd always presented our case to Congress. As we get more intellectual, better educated I guess you would say, we need more horse sense. That is what the Secretary (McNamara) lacked.

Q. 2. Doesn't the fleet still discriminate against officers who receive post-graduate training?

A. 2. Well, yes. I remember when I sat on my last selection board in 1954-55. I didn't think time in school was worthwhile. If a man's record came up and he had spent three years in school while he was a Commander, that was three years that he wasn't gaining any experience. He didn't have any fitness reports. I don't want some professor telling me who I should promote. But we can't do that anymore. I don't feel that we should emphasize schooling too much, but if you come up with two officers who are equal in all other respects, then maybe the advantage should go to the officer with schooling. If they are equal in all other respects.

Q. 3. In a recent book, James Roherty has said that the Navy "did not enter into the fray (about the nuclear carrier in 1962) with its customary assuredness....there was noticeable ambivalence in the Navy attitude toward nuclear propulsion....the Navy had allowed a doctrinal gap to develop with respect to the utilization of attack carriers." Is that the way you saw it?

A. 3. When Korth called me over, I didn't know what was going on, but I was suspicious. I never could figure out why George took that Ambassador job. I was really furious. Fred asked me if I would take the job and I said no, I didn't want the job, I already had four stars and wouldn't get any more and I wanted the job in London. Well, Fred asked me to go sit outside because he had a couple of things to do and then we'd go down and talk to Bob (McNamara). We got started down and he said that Bob was out of town and that we'd go in and talk to Gilpatrick. As soon as we walked in, he was talking to me and not me to him. It was obvious that Korth had called him. So after awhile it became obvious that the President had already made up his mind, and when I asked Gilpatrick that he said it was true. I told him that I'm not that big a fool, so I'd take the job.

I looked at my job as one of pouring oil on troubled waters. The Navy and the Secretary of Defense had gotten so far apart the Navy was not going to get anything. All communications had broken down. I know many people felt I was kow-towing and they were right. I would have kissed McNamara's ass at high noon if I thought it would help to smooth things over and there were many times I felt I had. There were lots of times that I didn't agree with him, but I never fought him in public or underhandedly with the Congress. The fellow who said he would rather be right than President was never President. With respect to the carrier, I felt we needed a deck. Also I had never been a rabid supporter of the need for nuclear power for a carrier. If we needed nuclear power it was for the destroyers. They had to be refueled every day, the carrier only every three to five days. I remember talking in his office with Pastori and he said, Admiral you are settling for a slice and we are trying to get a whole loaf. I said, yes, but we're awfully hungry.

I probably never would have made it if it hadn't of been for Ike Kidd (now Chief of Naval Material). He was my aide and he always said, Admiral, if you quit the chances are 99 out of 100 that your relief will think the same way you do, but he won't have the experience you have had in dealing with the current situation. I almost turned in my suit, but I finally didn't. Everyone wondered how I got along with McNamara and Gilpatrick and Nitze. I didn't agree but I had made up my mind that I would get along so that the Navy could profit in the end. Nitze and I discussed that we would have to get along. His aide was Bud Zumwalt and he walked the fine line of not being disloyal to either Nitze or me. Bud was in tight with Nitze. I have never been happier with Barry Goldwater when he refused to permit Nitze to be appointed to ISA the other week. I can't prove it, but I think that Bud would have been back in the Pentagon within a few weeks as a civilian. I even got along with Alain Enthoven. He was a real intellectual, but I got along with him. He came down to tell me goodby before I left and I told him why I had gotten along with him, it was because I knew that he didn't believe in some of those things he had supported. He had been directed to find a way of supporting some decision McNamara wanted to make and he did so. I don't have any quarrel with a man like that.

The only time that I went to McNamara and said I couldn't support him was over the FDL. The concept was bad, that this ship was going to pull up to a prepared dock and make an unopposed landing. The whole purpose of the idea was to cut down the Army by bringing troops back from Europe. I told Bob that, and he said, well, I'll kill it then if you're going to oppose me. I told him that I wasn't going to oppose it, no sir, but I would not support it.

Dick Russell and I were from the same small town in Georgia, probably about 6000 people total, but I never used our friendship. If I couldn't do it above board, I didn't do it. The only time I went to him was when Humphrey was trying to get the CNO's house. Dick didn't know that the bill was even under consideration and he told me he'd take care of it. Kidd was doing some things under the table with Congress on the TFX and I ordered him to stop it when I relieved.

McNamara really had us over a barrel. He was trying to reduce the number of carriers to 10 or 12. We had never had any justification for the number of carriers except that we said that we had to have three for every one deployed, that we needed two for NATO and three for SEATO, so we needed fifteen. We said that for so long everyone believed it, particularly our allies. We ended up keeping them deployed so long we ended up wearing down the American bluejacket. McNamara could cut our legs out from under us. Requirements are a matter of opinion. We are an easy target because it is impossible to prove requirements. You can always change your assumptions, it is only a matter of justifying your opinion. This is one of the main reasons I disagree with Zumwalt. I have never publically opposed him, I told him I wouldn't, but change sould be gradual. All requirements are essentially a matter of opinion, and if your successor also makes radical changes then the Navy goes all over the map, zigging and zagging. All changes should be gradual, then if time proves you're going in the right direction, your successor can increase the amount of change.

I believed that the time had come for nuclear power, but I also believed that we wouldn't get a nuclear CVA-67 without at least a delay of one year. Actually we never would have gotten the carrier. If we had made an issue and fought McNamara, he would have delayed the carrier, and we would have had to fight the battle again the next year and the next year and the next. Time was important. We needed the carrier. In the end, McNamara went along with me. There was no change in analysis. McNamara just became convinced that the Navy was not his enemy. In addition, it was possible at the time to advocate the conventional power plant, without arguing against nuclear power.

There were a hell of a lot of things on my mind that were more important than the nuclear carrier. Let me give you an example of the need for rapport with the Secretary of Defense. When it was time to name a new CINCPAC, I was completely outvoted in the JCS. Even the Commadant of the Marine Corps voted against me and he wondered why I didn't support him later. I supported the Corps, but not him. Anyway, it was important that the Navy get the job. I didn't think the war was going to last forever, and when it was over, the other services weren't going to be interested in that area. So I went to McNamara and told him I wanted Sharp in that job but the rest of the Chiefs were voting for the Air Force man. McNamara told me he'd take care of it and he did so, despite the combined votes of the Chiefs. The only problem was that then I owed the son of a bitch a favor.

Q. 4. Did you feel McNamara was using the threat of not building other surface ships to prevent a strong Navy position on the nuclear carrier?

A. 4. No. The whole thing was a matter of money. McNamara was a pacifist, you know. He was a perfect schoolteacher. There was a Jeckle and Hyde personality. We were having him over to dinner and my wife was scared how she would respond to such a cold fish. I told her she would find him interesting. Afterward she told me that he was absolutely charming. McNamara was trying to hold the budget down. Johnson didn't want the public to know how much it was costing. He wouldn't let us call up the reserves. McNamara was telling him what Johnson wanted to hear when Bob told him it could be done out of stockpiles and then rebuilt over a long period. The President was interested in domestic politics and didn't want to be bothered with international affairs. Just like Nixon is the opposite. The President would make a decision on what he could sell politically for a budget and it was difficult to argue with a man with his credentials.

It was impossible to tell what was the President's policy or what was McNamara's. I remember in the Spring of 1965, when I almost turned in my suit. The Chiefs and McNamara had agreed on a policy and he went to explain it to the President. The next day he came back and we sat down and he said now this is what we're going to do. I said wait a minute, Bob, you've got this turned around. We didn't agree on this, and he said this is what I've decided. I said, why don't you just say that the President didn't buy our plan. I tell my Heads when someone doesn't buy something, and then I tell them to get out and do it. I don't tell the Lieutenant Commanders, but I tell my leaders. And Bob sat there and said that's not the way I do it. So it was difficult to assign blame.

You know Johnson was sincere. He had always said that when he got to a position of responsibility, he was going to do something for the poor people, and when he got there he was saddled with that war that he couldn't get out of. In addition, he had a staff that was composed of some Kennedy-phobes. They thought that everything Kennedy had done was perfect and that any change was wrong. I would have fired the whole lot of them.

The JCS lost Johnson. When he first became President we met with him for cocktails and lunch at least once a week and then after a while it was only once a month, and then for the last one and a half years it was no meetings. I've thought for a long time how we lost him and I think it was because we didn't support the manner in which he wanted to conduct the war. Those meetings were really open with give and take and he understood how we felt. After a while it became embarrassing for him to invite us in to criticize him.

Before we lost him, we were down at the ranch a lot. I always sat across from him at the table where we had drinks and then we would go for a drive in several cars and I always rode with him, and then we would come back at the big table they had improvised. Well, we did that once and the Chiefs were standing around talking afterward and getting ready to leave, and Wheeler said that we ought to say goodby to the President and I went back and told him goodby and he grabbed me and leaned over and whispered, "Now you just don't worry about that carrier, you hear" and I knew that I had won. I went back outside and told the other Chiefs. Well, boys, I won.

Q. 5. How were the Navy's relations with Congress? Did that have an impact upon the Carrier?

A. 5. Well, I never used my relationship with Dick Russell except for that once. John Connally is probably the best friend I ever had in the world. He and I were shipmates during the war. I didn't use politics the way Zumwalt does, buttonholing people on particular issues and trying to find ways of getting to them. I stopped Kidd from giving Congress info under the table. I said that we'd go up to the Committee anytime, but above board.

Of course, everyone has different methods. I tried to establish a reputation of validity with Congress. They knew that I would tell the truth. I was the first CNO to invite visiting CNOs to stay at my house rather than at a hotel. And a few weeks after relieving I noticed that a Congressman had played football at Michigan so I called him up and invited him to go with me to the Navy-Michigan football game. He said that unfortunately he always took his eldest sons along with him, so I invited them, too. Then Jerry Ford and I went out and within a couple of months he and his wife were guests at my house. We always had some Congressmen as guests at all of our social occasions, when just a few couples sat around and talked. And when I went up on the Hill, I had a friend in court, but I didn't discuss specific issues.

Probably the best training I had for the job as CNO was when I was aide to Dan Kimble and he moved to be the Under Secretary. He really was an under secretary. In England, the military never appear on the Hill, just the civilians. Well, Dan was an old lobbyist and he loved it. He was really good, he did everything I suggested. I ran the Navy more from his office than I did when I was CNO. I really got to know quite a few Congressmen in that job. Dan was really a diamond in the rough. He drank a lot and ran around a lot and I had to watch out for him. One thing about Congressmen that you will have to realize is that the great majority of them are honest patriots doing their job. In some cases, they become convinced that the country is best off with them in office and they will do things that you and I might not do, but they honestly believe that it is for the good of the country.

Q. 6. Did you feel that McNamara and his staff were initially biased toward the selection of land based tactical air versus sea based tactical air because of their backgrounds?

A. 6. There was no question about that. In fact, the bias toward the Air Force was shown by the TFX affair. The most critical design parameter were those involved with carrier operation. The several parameters which were most critical should have been selected and then the plane designed inside the envelope. I have no conflict with the services having the same plane which is not the optimum design for any one job. I think that it probably would save money. The Navy wasted its time fighting the concept. I told my people to make it work because it was the only thing we were going to get. I then stayed clear from any knowledge of it because I knew it would fail. If you look at my Congressional testimony, I always say, "My technical people tell me it will work, and I believe in them." No one asked me what my seat of the pants evaluation was, and I never volunteered it. You don't realize the bitterness that had been engendered by the TFX fight. The TFX was more than 50% of our problems

with McNamara. You don't insult a man's baby daughter. The atmosphere of hatred affected everything else. I supported the TFX in order to get other things and because I knew that if I didn't we wouldn't get anything else, period.

Reconstruction completed 0120,
3 May 1974

D. R. Oliver, Jr.

Interview with Admiral James Russell, USN (ret), (Vice Chief of Naval Operations from June 1958 - May 1961) conducted on 30 April 1974 from 1700 to 2040 and 2 May from 1600-1800 between Dulles International Airport and the Army-Navy Club. No notes were taken. This paraphrasion was reconstructed from memory beginning at 2215 on 30 April 1974.

Q. 1. Adm. Russell--In discussing the decisions Mr. McNamara made, James Roherty said that with respect to the Nuclear Carrier "the Navy did not enter into the fray with its customary assuredness....there was noticeable ambivalence in the Navy attitude toward nuclear propulsion.... the Navy had allowed a doctrinal gap to develop with respect to the utilization of attack carriers."

From a reading of some of the material, it appeared to me that it may have been more complicated than that. What were your perceptions?

A. 1. You have to understand the circumstances. The Navy did not have too good a position with the Secretariat before McNamara. We had a great deal of trouble with Secretary Gates. Two examples are pertinent. Gates was interested in playing down interservice rivalry, and when Admiral Libby made a speech in San Diego which was purely inflamatory, Gates demanded that Burke (the CNO) fire Libby, that he require that Libby resign immediately. Burke refused and told Gates he (Burke) was willing to go to the President over it.

The second example occurred over the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). Burke felt that the whole idea was nothing more than an effort to give the whole strategic package to the Air Force. He went to the President (Eisenhower) over it but the President upheld his Secretary, so we lost, but Burke insisted that the second in command at the JSTPS (which constructs the SIOP) be Navy, a 3-star, and since the SIOP was computerized, Burke went out and took a course in computers.

Gates was pretty mad at us and he told McNamara he had to watch these Admirals and Generals or they'd run over him. For a man of McNamara's personality, that was all he needed.

We also did not make a good start with the new Secretary of the Navy--Connally. As soon as he was named, Burke invited him up to stay at the Observatory House. The problem is that Burke is not a good host. Connally came up without his wife and was rattling around that house and Burke forgot about him. Burke gets so involved, he just forgets. Anyway, I arranged a bachelor party for him and went looking for some good remarks to introduce him with. I found out that, very much to his credit, he had been a fighter director aboard a carrier during World War II and when the action got hot and his Congressional friends wanted to bring him back, he refused to go back. I also found out that he didn't drink. When I had the party and introduced him, he took my relating of these facts wrong, and when he stood up he only said, "You have excellent G-2." and sat down. Burke and Russell were in trouble from then on.

To understand the rest of our problems, you have to understand what sort of person McNamara was. He was cold, impersonal and inconsiderate. For a couple of examples of how he disregarded people, he went mountain climbing in the Northwest and didn't even bother to tell anyone he was coming or that he was there. Later (1963) I invited him to stay

at my villa in Italy when he was in the area, and he didn't even bother to answer. His secretary came over and we had a really nice time. McNamara didn't care about anybody!

Q. 2. Was Adm. Burke an effective "politician" for the Navy or was he somewhat restrained by the events of 1949 in which Burke had been taken off the Admirals' list and the CNO (ADM Dedman) had been fired over the objections of Congress?

A. 2. Burke was a poor speaker. This helped him on the Hill because of his reputation (as a war hero). When he searched for a word, everyone was leaning forward trying to help him. He wasn't a particularly good politician. He didn't like to use politics (influence on the Hill) or use system analysis to try to muddy up the waters. He wasn't like Zumwalt, he was reluctant to get in there and lobby and to be "cute" about analysis tricks or Congressional ties.

He was not at all inhibited by the events of 1949. I served with him in the Pacific during the war. He didn't change. No one thought he was inhibited.

Q. 3. Did you perceive that Secretary McNamara and his immediate staff were particularly pro- or con- the AF or the Navy?

A. 3. There is no question about the fact that they favored the Air Force. They understood more about them. At least they understood about a land-based tactical air forces. They didn't understand about how you got the logistics, the POL, there. They had this idea about bare-base deployment which was half-baked. We had terrible problems trying to educate them. A man named Rosenzweig was the man who was in charge of analysis of this and he didn't understand the use of carriers. We never did succeed in educating him, in fact, he got worse before he left. There was a point in which he was being questioned in Congress and they got down on him, felt he was misrepresenting various problems and he really lost emotional control. He was really impossible toward the end.

Do you remember how Adm. Anderson got fired. The whole problem was over some testimony before a Committee on the Hill. All the members of the Secretary's staff were sitting around with sharpened pencils waiting for a copy of his statement and he told them he didn't have one, he was just going up there to tell the truth (about the TFX). Then McNamara sent (Secretary of the Navy) Korth out to the Observatory on a Sunday morning to tell Anderson that he was fired. On a Sunday morning when Anderson was getting ready for an afternoon party for various members of different staffs, Korth came out to tell him he was fired. Anderson immediately called Kennedy who didn't know anything about it. Anderson was really deeply hurt. He went in to see McNamara about it the next morning and McNamara came across his room with his hand out and Anderson put his hand behind him and said, "No, Mr. Secretary, you have deeply hurt me, I always have believed that a man should be able and required to tell the truth."

Anyway there was quite some talk about the firing and McNamara told Kennedy that if the President appointed Anderson to anything in the Continental United States that he, McNamara, would resign. So Kennedy offered Anderson the Ambassadorship to Portugal. Anderson asked for 48

hours to think it over. Burke advised him not to take it, that it was time to make a stand, and not to take anything from them, but Adm. Claude Rickets was the VCNO and he advised Anderson to take it because he could do the country some good as an Ambassador. Anderson took Ricketts advice and Burke was furious.

I always felt that Korth was instrumental in seeing that the TFX got awarded to Texas. I always felt there was something crooked there. I never did figure out how he got appointed to a position of public trust. He wasn't an honest man. I think Connally just recommended him because he was from Texas. Not even his wife could stand him, she divorced him because he was so obnoxious.

There was no other reason to make that decision. I went into McNamara's office with Curt LeMay, and I told McNamara that a second rate fighter aircraft was no fighter at all. You can have a second-rate bomber, but what escorts that bomber in?* The supersonic capability at low altitudes that the Air Force needed was being compromised in order to reduce the weight to that which could be handled by the carrier launching gear. As it was, the most optimum (best) catapult which was installed on any carrier would have been the only one capable of launching the aircraft. McNamara didn't understand how difficult it was to achieve a capability to handle the aircraft. He didn't understand what he was doing to the Air Force plane in order to make it meet Navy requirements. I said, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary," and Curt and I got up to leave. Then Curt blurted out, "But Mr. Secretary, if we have to use the same plane, it really should be built to Air Force specifications." That was typical LeMay.

McNamara didn't fire LeMay when he fired Anderson. LeMay had gained too much national support from his performance as head of SAC. He also had an aura about him which made the Secretary afraid of him. He had done a good job for them there, although noone ever thought that he was an intellectual heavyweight as Chief of Staff. Anyway, McNamara called LeMay in his office and talked to him and led him along, telling him how unhappy he was with the job that LeMay was doing and then at the end he said, "and so, I've decided to ask you to stay on as Chief of Staff." LeMay went over to the window that looks over the river entrance (to the Pentagon) and looked out while he composed himself. He was really upset, and then he said, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your confidence." and walked out. He was furious.

McNamara couldn't even use his own staff. You remember "McNamara's Fence" (in Vietnam). He couldn't get his own staff to do it, so he came to me and asked me to evaluate it with General Starbird. It was designed to combat infiltration but the Marines thought it was Maginot Line mentality. You tell the enemy where you are going to stand and fight him. They cleared some areas for the implantation of his devices, but the areas also could serve awfully well as machine gun sweep/control areas. McNamara came to me directly to ensure that the program was carried out (it used Navy sonobouys) because he couldn't even rely on his own staff.

* He said, "But Jim, we'll save a billion dollars."

Q. 4. Did you feel that Adm. Rickover was cooperating with the rest of the Navy on the question of nuclear power for the carrier/surface ships?

A. 4. Adm. Rickover felt that nuclear power was good for everything. (Adm. Russell avoided commenting specifically on the thrust of the question although the question was posed, in different forms, at least four times). I remember the first time we met.

The first time I met Rickover, we had an electrical system in those days that was 12 volts DC and it was cranky. The first time a new pilot got out on the deck with the wind going over, he'd overprime the engine and run down the battery. Then we'd have to get him off the line and out of the way someway. Well, I figured out that if we ran jumper cables out to the planes we could get him off no matter how much he overprimed the engine. I figured that if I placed four small motor-generators around the deck I could make it work. I talked to the Air Wing Commander and the Captain and got in a plane and went to try to get permission to do so. I went down to Main Navy yard (in Washington) and wandered around trying to find out who was in charge. Finally, I found the officer that was in charge of the Electrical Division, a Lt. Rickover. I explained to him what I wanted to do and he immediately flew into a rampage. He said, "Do you know how much copper that would take? There's not that much copper in the United States, etc., etc." Anyway he chased me out, and I had to return to the ship from my unsuccessful trip with my tail between my legs.

He was thorough though, nothing ever got put on any ship that he personally had not approved.

The second time we met, I was Commanding Officer of a carrier out in the Pacific following World War II and things were pretty slack, we were making up for the war. I remember setting the course so that we would raise Wake Island at dawn and I got on the MC system myself and saying "Now everyone Wake up and see the Island." Anyway in 1947 I got orders to report to Oak Ridge, and would end up being there from 1947 to 1950. When I got there, it was still under Army command. Captain Rickover was there and I found out that he was the most popular man there. I couldn't believe that this was the same Rickover that I knew. I asked around and found out that he stood number one in his training class and had impressed everyone. He was obsessed with the idea of putting nuclear power on a submarine and all the scientists there were really impressed with him and were in favor of his efforts.

I remember when Nautilus went under the pole and we were trying to outdo the Russian Sputnik achievement. Rickover had been against the project from the beginning. When Anderson, I don't know whether he is Senator or Representative Anderson now, but when he got out from under the pole, we picked him up at sea and flew him into Reykjavik (Iceland) and then to Washington. His wife was brought to meet the President and she didn't know where they had gone or when they would be back. I was in charge of getting the guests there and Eisenhower got to worrying about the fact that there might be too many people there. I had already invited CINCLANT, the operational commander, I was hoping he wouldn't want to come but he accepted. When Gates asked me if we should invite Rickover, I said "no, he wasn't concerned with operational matters." Well, the ceremony went off and Mrs. Anderson was really surprised. The reporters noticed that Rickover wasn't there and went to see him to ask him why he wasn't there. Well, you know Rickover, he wouldn't ever help anybody out. He said, "The sons of bitches didn't invite me." Well,

the next day there were headlines all over the place. Gates had to take the blame to take it off the President and he wasn't happy. As penance, I had to ride between Anderson and Rickover in the New York City ticker tape parade. Rickover is a remarkable man. I believe all his success is due to his thoroughness. He is tireless and exacting.

Rickover went on a tour of Russia and was invited to tour their nuclear icebreaker in addition to many other areas and when he came back I asked him to come over and speak to the officers in OPNAV. He agreed to and gave a really good speech. Afterward, he was in my office and looking at me the way he does and he said, "you know, you can get people to work for you by being nice to them. I never could." I avoided the obvious question as to whether he had ever tried.

Rick had convinced the Congress that the only thing that was useful was nuclear power. They were even on the point of passing a resolution that all surface ships had to be nuclear-powered. Nuclear power was a revolution in submarines, but was only another method of pushing for a surface ship.

Q. 5. How was the feeling in Congress toward the Navy and the Carrier?

A. 5. There was no question that we had problems. Mahon was even worse than Cannon in many respects. The primary problem we were having in Congress was that they wouldn't vote for the carrier requests unless it was nuclear-powered and we couldn't get it through the Secretary as nuclear-powered. We lost both ways. The big objection to the nuclear carrier was cost.

Q. 6. Was there any carryover from the Mitchell controversy about Carrier vulnerability?

A. 6. The Air Force was always sniping. They were a new service and they didn't have the responsibilities that the other two did. This gave them a great deal more flexibility in establishing various positions.

Q. 7. Vincent Davis credits you as being "Father of the Polaris". Did you feel that the great amount of money being spent for nuclear-powered tactical and strategic submarines detracted from the building up of tactical forces thus leading to block obsolescence?

A. 7. Burke used to have a stack of chits on his desk when he was CNO that had a blank spot to fill in that said "BLANK is the Inventor of the Polaris." I was BUAIR back when BUAIR really had some power. The man who really thought of marrying the submarine and the ballistic missile was Charlie ------ who worked for me. We had an air breathing missile at that time but it didn't have sufficient range. So it was obvious that the solid propellant ballistic missile was the way to go. I went to see Charlie Wilson, who was Secretary of Defense at the time. He said we could do it if we used the Army missile, the Jupiter. Well, the Jupiter was a liquid propellant missile. Can you imagine loading that extremely noxious nitric oxide on board a submarine? It was an impossible idea. Well, I had some power at the time, so I issued three contracts by myself for the development of a solid propellant missile.

There was no question that the submarines were expensive and were detracting from the normal building program. We still have the Block obsolescence problem. Zumwalt's High/Low mix is probably the worst answer to that.

Completed reconstruction at 0045,
1 May 1974

D. R. Oliver, Jr.

	Gate's		McNamara's			
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Total DoD budget	$42.6B	43.6	51.4	55.4	54.0	51.6
Total DoD Procurement	$15.1B	14.6	17.9	17.6	14.9	13.9
Army Procurement	$ 1.3B	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.9	1.7
Army % of Total Procurement	9%	10	14	14	19	12
Air Force Procurement						
Aircraft	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.5
Missiles	3.0	2.6	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.7
Other	1.0	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8
Airlift mod.	-	0.3	0.4	-	-	-
Total	$ 7.0B	7.0	7.3	6.8	6.4	6.0
AF % of Total Procurement	46%	48	41	39	43	43
Navy Procurement						
Ship Construction and Conversion	$ 2.0B	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.1	1.9
Aircraft & Missiles	2.1	2.1	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.5
Other	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.0
Total	4.5	5.3	6.4	6.8	6.2	6.4
Navy % of Total Procurement	30%	36	36	39	42	46
Breakdown of Ship Construction and Conversion Funds						
Polaris	$ 1.2B	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.07	-
Other Warships	0.7	1.4	1.3	0.8	0.4	0.5
Amphibious	0.04	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6
Mine Warfare and Patrol Craft	0.07	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.4
Auxiliaries	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4
Total	$ 2.0B	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.1	1.9
% of Total Procurement	13%	19	16	16	14	14
% of Total Procurement (less Polaris)	6%	13	12	13	14	14
Construction Funds for:						
CVAs	1	-	1	-	-	-
DLGNs	-	-	-	-	-	-
DLGs	3	6	-	-	-	-
DDs	2	2	-	---	-	-
DEs	-	-	8	-	16	10
SSNs	2	3	8	6	6	4
SSBNs	3	5	6	6	-	-
ASRs	-	-	-	1	1	1

Source. The Budget of the United States Government For the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 19XX. Also see Mendel River's letter to SECDEF of 24 March 1965 as reprinted in JCAE, 1967-68 Hearings, op. cit.